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INTRODUCTION
''W HAT do I have to do-have him kill someone before
something will be done?"' asked the mother of the schiz-
ophrenic, delusional young Mr. Head, 2 who was respond-
*Associate Professional Specialist in Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1985,
University of Virginia; J.D. 1988, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would
like to thank Judie Barger, Anne Bergamesca, Ronald Bergamesca, John Blume, Alfred L.
Head, Keith McKenney, Otto Wahl, and research assistants Iva Futrell and Kate
McSweeny.
1. Psychological Report at 7, Commonwealth v. Head, No. 95018 (Fairfax, Va. 1999)
(prepared by William J. Stejskal, Ph.D.) (statement of Zona Head).
2. This author defended Mr. Head on the charge of first degree murder of his
mother, Zona Head, in Criminal Case No. 95018, Fairfax County Courthouse, 4410 Chain
Bridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia 20030.
2191
SMU LAW REVIEW
ing to command hallucinations that demanded he kill both himself and
his parents. Nine days later, he sawed at his throat with a knife, cutting
all the way through his trachea. Throughout the six weeks after surviving
emergency surgery for his transected trachea, Mr. Head continued to re-
fuse psychiatric treatment. He then drove his mother's car into the
house, pulled out a baseball bat, and beat his mother to death.3 Although
the life-saving surgical procedure to repair his severed throat had been
forced upon him without waiting for his consent, psychiatric treatment
never was. Three days before he killed his mother, Mr. Head went back
to the same hospital, still suffering delusions, and reported feeling sui-
cidal and homicidal.4 A few hours later, he left the hospital against medi-
cal advice prior to receiving any psychiatric treatment. He fit the
scientific profile of an individual poised to become extremely violent,5
but no one attempted to hold him against his will to keep him from acting
on his command hallucinations, and no one requested court-ordered in-
voluntary psychiatric treatment.6 His mother was right. Nothing was
done until he killed someone-her. 7
Yet compare the failure to recognize the future dangerousness of Mr.
Head with the confident prediction of the future expressed in Randall
Dall Adams' case below. The volatile and delusional nature of Mr.
Head's illness was ignored, even while he expressed suicidal and homici-
dal thoughts. In sharp contrast, psychiatrist Dr. Grigson's prediction that
Mr. Adams would kill in the future was sworn to be absolute.8
Dr. Grigson, diagnosed Mr. Adams "as being a (sic) sociopathic per-
sonality disorder. On the scale of sociopathy, . . . I would place Mr. Ad-
ams at the very extreme, worse or severe end of the scale. You can't get
beyond that.., there is nothing known in the world today that is going to
change this man, we don't have anything."9 Dr. Grigson confidently pro-
claimed that Mr. Adams "would continue to be a threat to society," after
asserting that Mr. Adams would have no regard for the lives or property
3. Peter Pae, Man Found Insane in Mother's Killing, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1999, at
B7.
4. "Three days after Alfred L. Head walked out of the psychiatric unit at Inova
Fairfax Hospital in July 1998, he beat his mother to death with a baseball bat in their
Reston home. Less than two months earlier, he'd been in the same unit after slashing his
throat to the windpipe and leaping headfirst off a balcony." Tom Jackman, Doctor, Nurses
Acquitted in Insanity Case; Va. Man Who Beat Mother to Death Shouldn't Have Left Hospi-
tal, Father Says, WASH. POST, May 11, 2001, at B2.
5. See discussion infra Part II.B.
6. "[Some] compared the tragedy to the shootings at the U.S. Capitol... [in that] the
suspect ... was not kept at a mental hospital despite a history of mental problems ... [one
neighbor] said the family had told him that the son often resisted efforts to keep him in
treatment plans." Wendy Melillo & Erica Beshears, Man Charged in Mother's Death;
Friends Say Woman Had Struggled With Son's Mental Condition, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
1998, at B3.
7. Pae, supra note 3, at B7.
8. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET. AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVIC-
TIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 66 (1992).
9. A Danger to Society: Fooling the Jury with Phony Experts (quoting Tr. at 1407,
Adams v. State (CCA No. 60,037)), in A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death
Penalty, available at http://www.texasdefender.org/study/chapter3.html.
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of others, wherever they might be: "It wouldn't matter where it was [or
whose life], you or a guard or a janitor or whoever it might be." 10 On
May 3, 1977, Randall Dale Adams was sentenced to death for a crime he
did not commit.
Seven days before Mr. Adams' scheduled execution in 1979, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted a stay of execution, and ultimately reversed the
death sentence but not the conviction.11 "Finally, on March 21, 1989-
exactly twelve years and three months after being taken into custody-
Randall Dale Adams was released. ' 12 He had been completely exoner-
ated when the star prosecution witness, himself sentenced to death for
another murder, admitted that he lied, and additional evidence proved
that Mr. Adams was never involved in the murder. Thus, in spite of the
psychiatrist's dire vision of Mr. Adams' future behavior, there have been
no acts of violence or arrests for any crime. Neither while incarcerated
nor since his release in 1989 has Mr. Adams been anything other than
non-violent. 13
These two cases demonstrate a strange paradox in psychiatric testi-
mony. In cases where psychiatry can make fairly accurate predictions-
such as young, schizophrenic Mr. Head's propensity to become violent-
either no court action is taken, or the psychiatric prediction is minimized.
In capital murder cases where psychiatry has no greater ability to accu-
rately predict the future than does common sense, psychiatric testimony
is heavily relied upon.14 The distinction between these two cases is that
Mr. Head was suffering from a mental illness that produced delusions,
and under such conditions psychiatry has developed fairly reliable criteria
for predicting violence in the near future.1 5 Mr. Adams, however, was
not diagnosed with a mental illness that results in psychosis. 16 Rather,
Dr. Grigson was using the lay term, sociopath,' 7 to refer to anti-social
10. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tr. at 1410, Adams v. State (CCA No. 60,037)).
11. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); RADELET ET AL., supra note 8, at 67, 72.
12. RADELET ET AL., supra note 8, at 72.
13. A Danger to Society, supra note 9.
14. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCE ISSUES (2002).
[E]xpert testimony predicting violence has been, and remains, an extraordi-
narily controverted use of science in the trial process. In fact, courts regu-
larly remark that predicting future behavior is inherently difficult and most
research indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists do not do it well. This
area of the law thus presents a paradox in which judges seemingly take the
most lenient approach toward scientific evidence involving some of the most
controversial science to enter the courtroom.
Id.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. "The narrowest definition of psychotic is restricted to delusions or prominent hal-
lucinations, with the hallucinations occurring in the absence of insight into their pathologi-
cal nature. A slightly less restrictive definition would also include prominent
hallucinations that the individual realizes are hallucinatory experiences." AMERICAN PSY-
CHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 273 (4th ed. 1994) [here-
inafter DSM-IV].
17. Antisocial personality disorder "has also been referred to as psychopathy, soci-
opathy, or dyssocial personality disorder." Id. at 645.
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personality disorder, 18 a diagnosis that does not include delusions or
hallucinations.
At the time of Dr. Grigson's testimony and continuing on to today, no
methodology for accurately predicting future violence based on the diag-
nosis of anti-social personality disorder exists.1 9 Thus, Dr. Grigson's tes-
timony would have failed the federal test for admissibility of scientific
evidence. This standard, articulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,20 applies only to federal cases. None-
theless, it is a useful model for the discussion of the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence in general. An examination of psychiatric testimony within
the Daubert admissibility framework reveals the flaws of current usage of
such testimony.2'
Part I of this article explains that predictions of future violence are
routinely made by psychiatrists in both capital murder trials and civil
commitment hearings and describes the difficulties inherent in both us-
ages. Part II of this article examines the reliability of both psychiatric
diagnoses as well as the ability of psychiatrists to predict violence. Part
III concludes with an explanation of why such testimony should only be
admissible when it meets the relevancy and reliability test expressed in
18. The American Psychiatric Association provides the criteria for anti-social person-
ality disorder:
Diagnostic criteria for 301.7 Antisocial Personality Disorder
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights
of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of
the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or con-
ning others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical
fights or assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated or stolen from another.
B. The individual is at least age 18 years.
C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15 years.
The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course
of Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode.
Id. at 650.
19. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
American Psychiatric Association (APA) ... informs us that 'the unreliability of psychiat-
ric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the
profession.'... [at] best two out of three predictions of long-term future violence made by
psychiatrists are wrong."); see also Thomas A. Widiger & Timothy J. Trull, Personality Dis-
orders and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK As-
SESSMENT 203-26 (John Monahan & Henry Steadman eds., 1994) ("Surprisingly, systematic
research on violent, aggressive tendencies among the mentally disordered has rarely con-
sidered disorders of personality [which includes anti-social personality disorder].").
20. 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see discussion of the Daubert holding infra Part lII.A.
21. See discussion infra Part |II.A.
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Daubert.22
I. PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
Predictions of whether or not an individual will pose a danger in the
future arise in various settings. Criteria for release of a criminal suspect
on bond typically include whether the individual poses a risk of flight or is
dangerous to the community.23 Decisions regarding sentencing, such as
whether to grant probation or to sentence a defendant to a "halfway"
house or other community-based punishment, always include an inquiry
into the defendant's potential for future dangerousness. 24 Parole boards
often consider not only the amount of time the prisoner has served, but
also whether the defendant is likely to re-offend.
25
One example of a scenario in which a court must predict future behav-
ior occurs at a bond hearing after a defendant has been arrested. During
a bond hearing, the court is presented with a short summary of the facts
of the crime, the details of any prior criminal record, the defendant's em-
ployment status, residence and other ties to the community, and argu-
ment by counsel. 26 Typically, there is no testimony given by witnesses.
Instead, the evidence is proffered by the prosecutor and defense attorney.
After proffer and argument, the court independently determines whether
and under what circumstances to release the defendant pending trial. No
expert evidence is presented to assist the court in predicting whether a
defendant is likely to become a danger to the community once released.
The court merely applies common sense to the facts. Typically, a higher
bond is set if the court finds any of the following evidence to exist: prior
history of violent crime; current charge is a violent crime; prior failures to
appear for court proceedings; lengthy criminal record, even if non-vio-
lent; no fixed address; no employment; no family or friends living in the
area.27 The court does not defer to a psychiatric expert to explain the
significance of those facts, but relies upon its own wisdom.
In a small minority of hearings, psychiatric testimony is offered and
relied upon, typically as evidence of whether the individual will pose a
threat in the future. The two primary types of court proceedings in which
psychiatrists and psychologists routinely testify are the penalty phase of
capital murder trials and civil commitment hearings. While experts tes-
tify in both types of cases, the weight given in each varies widely.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
23. For example, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 states that the court should consider
whether releasing the defendant will "endanger the safety of any other person or the com-
munity." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2003); see also id. § 3142(g)(4).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(2)(1)(A) (requiring courts to consider the factors enumerated
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in considering reduction of prison sentence).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.




Capital murder cases are tried in two phases. The first phase is the
guilt or innocence portion, where the jury decides whether the defendant
killed the victim and whether the elements of capital murder are satisfied.
The second phase of the trial is the penalty phase, in which the jury de-
cides whether to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment or the
death penalty. During the penalty phase, the prosecution is required to
prove aggravating circumstances: evidence that demonstrates that this de-
fendant is so evil or this murder is so repugnant that the death penalty is
justified. 28 The defense has the opportunity to introduce "mitigating" ev-
idence. 29 Such testimony can include the defendant's youth,30 good be-
havior while incarcerated, 3 1 childhood abuse, 32 and any other evidence
that demonstrates why the defendant deserves a sentence less than
death. 33
In several states one issue the jury may consider in choosing between a
life or death sentence is whether the defendant will commit future acts of
violence. 34 Typically, the prosecution presents the testimony of a psy-
28. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (requiring the jury to consider the
nature of the crime and the specific characteristics of the defendant does not violate the
Constitution); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (requiring the sentencing judge to
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances meets the constitutional standard for
invoking the death penalty); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (requiring the jury to find
aggravating circumstances and allowing the jury to consider particularized mitigating cir-
cumstances meets the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, allowing
the jury to invoke the death penalty).
29. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (a mitigating factor is "any aspect of the
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death").
30. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (petitioner's violent family background
is a relevant factor for consideration at sentencing hearing); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1986) (mitigating evidence of defendant's being abused as a child must be considered by
the jury at sentencing hearing).
31. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (evidence of adaptability to prison life
is relevant and the defendant should not be precluded from presenting such evidence in
mitigation).
32. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104; Penry, 492 U.S. at 302 (mitigating evidence of defen-
dant's being abused as a child must be considered by the jury at sentencing hearing).
33. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586.
34. Of the thirty-eight states that currently have the death penalty, fifteen allow some
consideration of future violence in sentencing determinations. Alabama does not require a
finding of future dangerousness in death penalty sentencing by statute, but allows evidence
to be presented "as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence and shall
include any matters relating to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances." ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-45(c) (2002). While future dangerousness is not one of the aggravating circum-
stances, and the Alabama Supreme Court does not allow it to be considered at the guilt
stage of a trial, it does allow courts to consider it during the sentencing phase. See, e.g.,
Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (rejecting the contention that
expert testimony on future dangerousness should be excluded from capital trials and hold-
ing that "[tlhe rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and state levels anticipate
that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the fact-
finder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the
opposing party").
In Arizona, future dangerousness is not an aggravating circumstance but expert testi-
mony as to future dangerousness is allowed by the courts. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703
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(2001). A defendant is also allowed to argue a lack of future dangerousness as a non-
statutory mitigating factor. Id.; see, e.g., Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 127 (2000) (hold-
ing that "[i]f the jury may make up its mind about future dangerousness unaided by psychi-
atric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the views of the State's
psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant's doctors").
In California, future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor under the Cali-
fornia Penal Code but the courts will allow it in rebuttal or if it is a permissible inference
based on the evidence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2002); see, e.g., People v. Ochoa,
966 P.2d 442 (Cal. 1999) (even if the prosecution is prohibited from offering expert testi-
mony predicting future dangerousness in its case-in-chief, it may explore the issue on cross-
examination or in rebuttal if defendant offers expert testimony predicting good prison be-
havior in the future).
In Georgia, future dangerousness is not an aggravating circumstance. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-30 (2001). The Code does allow for the inclusion of any mitigating circumstances
or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law in addition to the ten included in
the statute. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1999) (finding the issue of a
defendant's future dangerousness relevant in the sentencing phase).
In Idaho, a sentencing jury may consider the future dangerousness of the defendant. It
is one of the statutory aggravating factors: "The defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in
the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which
will probably constitute a continuing threat to society." IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie
2002); see, e.g., State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 1211 (Idaho 1995) (holding that the aggravating
circumstance related to the defendant's continuing threat to society is not unconstitution-
ally vague).
In Louisiana, future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor, LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West 2002); however, the law does allow the "character and
propensities" of the defendant to be considered by the jury, id.; see, e.g., State v. Cooks,
720 So. 2d 637 (La. 1998) (holding that it is proper to introduce evidence of the defendant's
gang-related activities because it shows future dangerousness).
In Missouri, future dangerousness is not an aggravating factor, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.032 (2001); however, the courts allow for admission of such evidence, see, e.g., State
v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1994) (character and future dangerousness evidence is
admissible at penalty phase).
Future dangerousness is not an aggravating circumstance under North Carolina law,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2001); however, the courts do allow the prosecutors broad
latitude in raising the issue, including raising it in reference to the defendant being danger-
ous to fellow inmates or prison guards if he is given life without parole, see, e.g., State v.
Davis, 539 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 2000) (evidence of future dangerousness is not improper in a
sentencing hearing).
In Oklahoma, "[t]he existence of a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society" is one of the eight
statutory factors considered by the sentencing court. OKLA. STA'r. tit. 21 § 701.12 (2002);
see, e.g., Bland v. State, 4 P.3d 702, 725 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (In order to establish the
aggravating circumstance that the defendant poses a continuing threat to society, the state
must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt: [fjirst, that the defendant's behavior has demon-
strated a threat to society; and [s]econd, a probability that this threat will continue to exist
in the future.").
In Oregon, the jury must determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to soci-
ety" as part of its death penalty consideration. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2001).
In Pennsylvania, future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating circumstance. 42
PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9711 (2002). Prosecutors are, however, allowed to address future dan-
gerousness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 675 A.2d 1221, 1234 n.15 (Pa. 1996)
("[D]efendant has a due process right to state-funded psychiatric assistance during the pen-
alty phase of a death penalty case where the assistance would be useful to rebut the prose-
cution's assertion of the defendant's 'future dangerousness' to society") (emphasis added)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Christy, 656 A.2d 877, 883 (Pa. 1995))).
Texas requires a finding of future dangerousness in death penalty cases. TEX. CODE.
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2002). Under section 2(b) of that article, the court
shall "[o]n conclusion of the presentation of the evidence ... submit the following issues to
the jury: (1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
2003] 2197
SMU LAW REVIEW
chologist or psychiatrist to develop that evidence. 35 The United States
Supreme Court has endorsed such use of psychiatric testimony.
In Jurek v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court approved the use
of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor in death penalty cases. 36
Jurek is one in a series of cases decided in 197637 that approved the newly
revised capital murder statutes replacing those that had been declared
unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia.38 In approving the revised Texas
statute, the Court determined that it met the requirements of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments because it allowed the jury to consider mit-
igating evidence by having them answer specific questions about the de-
fendant and his crime. "The Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides
and focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized cir-
cumstances of the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of
death." 39
In addition to two other questions,40 the revised Texas statute required
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2002). The state must prove future dangerousness "be-
yond a reasonable doubt." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(c) (Vernon 2002).
Future dangerousness is not an aggravating factor under Utah law, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-202; however, section 76-3-207 allows the court to consider "any other facts in ag-
gravation or mitigation of the penalty that the court considers relevant to the sentence,"
see, e.g., State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993). "Unlike the guilt phase of a trial, the
sentencing phase revolves around the character and background of a defendant." Id. at
353. Further, "[a]n examination into a defendant's character is mandatory in a capital
sentencing proceeding[, and a] jury may legitimately consider a defendant's character, fu-
ture dangerousness, lack of remorse, and retribution in the penalty phase hearing." Id.
Virginia requires a consideration of future dangerousness prior to imposition of a death
sentence:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the
death penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal re-
cord of convictions of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the
offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be
imposed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2002).
In Wyoming, the sentencing jury is permitted to consider whether "the defendant poses
a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit contin-
ued acts of criminal violence." Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2001).
35. "At least 121 Texas death row inmates were sentenced to death based on psychiat-
ric testimony." A Danger to Society, supra note 9.
36. 428 U.S. 262 (1976); A Danger to Society, supra note 9.
37. See cases cited supra note 28.
38. 409 U.S. 402 (1972).
39. Jurek, 428 U.S at 273-74.
40. The other two questions are:
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result;
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased."
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the jury to determine "whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society. ' '41 While acknowledging that it is difficult to predict the
future, the Court maintained:
The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not
mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of future criminal
conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to ad-
mit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge's
prediction of the defendant's future conduct. And any sentencing
authority must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct
when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to
impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must
be made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas jury must per-
form in answering the statutory question in issue is thus basically no
different from the task performed countless times each day through-
out the American system of criminal justice. What is essential is that
the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the
individual defendant whose fate it must determine. 42
In endorsing the future dangerousness question, the Court indicated that
such an inquiry would involve evidence that may in fact be mitigating, not
merely aggravating.
In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continu-
ing threat to society, the jury could consider whether the defendant
had a significant criminal record. It could consider the range and
severity of his prior criminal conduct. It could further look to the
age of the defendant and whether or not at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense he was acting under duress or under the domina-
tion of another. It could also consider whether the defendant was
under an extreme form of mental or emotional pressure, something
less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the emotions of the aver-
age man, however inflamed, could withstand. 43
The issue of psychiatric testimony, although perhaps inherent in the idea
of "mental or emotional pressure" was not directly addressed in the Jurek
case.
Soon after Jurek was affirmed, prosecutors began using psychiatrists to
bolster their evidence of future dangerousness. 44 In 1983, the United
States Supreme Court relied upon Jurek to hold that psychiatrists may
give expert opinions as to the future dangerousness of a capital murder
defendant.45 Thomas A. Barefoot was convicted of fatally shooting a po-
lice officer after he was apprehended as a suspect in an arson
Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(1)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976)).
41. Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1975-
1976)).
42. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76.
43. Id. at 273 (citing Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
44. See, e.g., A Danger to Society, supra note 9.
45. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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investigation. 46
At trial, two psychiatrists testified for the prosecution. Neither psychi-
atrist had personally evaluated the defendant or performed any psycho-
logical testing to determine whether he suffered from a mental illness at
the time of the crime. Yet based on a hypothetical presented by the pros-
ecutor that detailed the evidence against Mr. Barefoot, both psychiatrists
testified that he would be a continuing threat to society.47 Dr. Holbrook
diagnosed Mr. Barefoot "as a criminal sociopath. He testified that he
knew of no treatment that could change this condition, and that the con-
dition would not change for the better but 'may become accelerated' in
the next few years."' 48 Dr. Holbrook opined that Mr. Barefoot would
commit violent crimes in the future and was a threat to society, "and that
his opinion would not change if the 'society' at issue was that within Texas
prisons rather than society outside prison. '49
Dr. Grigson also testified based on the hypothetical that Mr. Barefoot
had "a fairly classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder .... He
placed Barefoot in the 'most severe category' of sociopaths (on a scale of
one to ten, Barefoot was 'above ten'), and stated that there was no known
cure for that condition. ' 50 Dr. Grigson likewise testified that even if Mr.
Barefoot remained in prison, there was a "one hundred percent and abso-
lute chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society."51
In essence, both doctors testified that Mr. Barefoot's "sociopathic per-
sonality disorder" deprived him of free will. Presumably, Mr. Barefoot
could never abstain from killing again because of his diagnosis. Such a
conclusion lacks a scientific foundation 52 and contradicts the criminal jus-
tice premise that individuals are punished for their volitional behavior.53
Without any scientific reliability inquiry prior to their testimony, both
doctors were allowed to testify as to their scientific conclusions.
These extremely damaging scientific predictions of certain future vio-
lence were admitted into evidence without any foundation being laid to
demonstrate the reliability of the predictions or the acceptance of the
practice of predicting future dangerousness in psychiatry. The admissibil-
ity of the psychiatrists' testimony was upheld despite the fact that the
American Psychiatric Association (the "APA") filed an amicus brief stat-
ing that "the unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future
46. Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
47. Id. at 887.
48, Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 919.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Widiger & Trull, supra note 19, at 203-26; Dale E. McNiel, Hallucinations and Vio-
lence, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 194
(John Monahan & Henry Steadman eds., 1994).
53. "The legal paradigm is constructed around assumptions of free will and individual
responsibility .... FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2.
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dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession. ' 54 In
addition, the APA's brief noted, "two out of three predictions of long-
term future violence made by psychiatrists are wrong. '55
In dismissing the claim that psychiatrists' are incompetent to reliably
predict the future, the Court implies that such testimony is widely ac-
cepted in this context. "The suggestion that no psychiatrist's testimony
may be presented with respect to a defendant's future dangerousness is
somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel. ' 56 In fact, while psychi-
atric testimony as to future behavior may have been accepted in other
contexts, the Court had never before permitted its use in a capital murder
trial. The "wheel" of capital murder statutes had in fact been re-invented
at the time of the Jurek decision-a decision that heralded the arrival of
the modern death penalty.
The Court's decision in Barefoot also failed to distinguish between ex-
pert opinion testimony and lay decisions about the defendant's future
dangerousness.
[I]f it is not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that
conclusion [that the defendant will be a danger in the future], it
makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the en-
tire universe of persons who might have an opinion on the issue,
would know so little about the subject that they should not be per-
mitted to testify.57
Here, the Court confuses expert opinion testimony with jury decisions. It
does not follow that because a jury must make a prediction about the
defendant's behavior that any and all witnesses are likewise permitted to
do so.
Essentially, the Court fails to acknowledge that the only reason the
psychiatrists are permitted to testify as to opinion, instead of being lim-
ited only to facts as all other witnesses are, is because they are qualified
as experts and therefore have some expertise in this area outside the
realm of everyday knowledge. 58 Surely the Court does not mean that the
psychiatrists' uneducated guesses are as good as anyone else's, and thus
anyone's speculation, feelings, or theory about the defendant's future
conduct is admissible at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial.
Would the Court have allowed the testimony to go forward if a police
detective, qualified as an expert because of his years of experience with
criminals, were called to testify as to the future dangerousness of the de-
fendant? What about a plumber, qualified as an expert to explain the
location of the pipes in the burning building-could he also opine about
the defendant's propensity for violence?
54. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing American Psychiatric
Association Amicus Curiae Brief, at 12).
55. Id. (citing American Psychiatric Association Amicus Curiae Brief, at 9, 13).
56. Id. at 896.
57. Id. at 896-97.
58. "In neither Barefoot nor in Jurek did the Court specifically explain why unreliable
expert testimony was admissible to assist the jury." FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 84.
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In addition, the Court's comment about not excluding only psychia-
trists "out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion on
the issue," ignores the fact that even if all other persons have an opinion
on the defendant's propensity to commit violence, those persons are not
permitted to testify. Opinion testimony, absent expert qualification, is
inadmissible in court.59 A jury draws conclusions from listening to facts,
not lay opinions. It may be that the entire universe of persons has an
opinion that the defendant is in fact guilty. Nevertheless, not a single one
of those persons will be allowed to testify regarding his or her opinion.
Even though the Court acknowledged that there was no psychiatric tes-
timony in Jurek, it still confuses these two issues. The Court stated, "Al-
though there was only lay testimony with respect to dangerousness in
Jurek, there was no suggestion by the Court that the testimony of doctors
would be inadmissible. '60 While there was testimony in Jurek about the
defendant's past history of violence, there was none about his future dan-
gerousness. This is an important distinction. Past violence is provable by
facts and demonstrated either by specific criminal convictions (such as
prior murders, assaults, rapes) or by unindicted but still extremely spe-
cific prior bad acts (witnesses who testify as to defendant's reputation for
violence, descriptions of assaults, etc.). Open-ended predictions of future
violence are merely a guess6 1-whether the guess is made by a layperson
or a psychiatrist.
In fact, three years before Barefoot, the Court had recognized that psy-
chiatrists were not necessary for predicting future dangerousness. "While
in no sense disapproving the use of psychiatric testimony bearing on the
issue of future dangerousness, the holding in Jurek was guided by recog-
nition that the inquiry mandated by Texas law does not require resort to
medical experts."'62 Indeed, in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Barefoot, he
noted:
Lay testimony.., would not raise this substantial threat of unreliable
and capricious sentencing decisions, inimical to the constitutional
standards established in our cases; and such predictions are as accu-
59. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1997).
[L]ay witnesses must testify from personal knowledge, and they may not of-
fer opinions. Expert witnesses comprise an entirely different category. An
expert witness is not limited to personal knowledge and may base her testi-
mony on information that was gathered solely for the purpose of testifying in
litigation. Moreover, under the proper circumstances an expert witness may
offer an opinion that goes well beyond her direct sensory impressions.
Id.
60. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897.
61. "Courts ordinarily do not require mental health experts to specialize in predicting
violent behavior. Instead, they assume that all psychologists and psychiatrists are capable
of making this determination .... FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 80.
62. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1980) (order vacating a death sentence was affirmed
because defendant had not been advised of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
before being interviewed by a court-ordered psychiatrist prior to the sentencing phase of
his trial, and had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when his counsel had
not been advised that future dangerousness would be considered by the psychiatrist).
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rate as any psychiatrist could make. Indeed, the very basis of Jurek
as I understood it, was that such judgements can be made by laymen
on the basis of lay testimony.63
Such lay testimony, already considered by jurors in deciding the dan-
gerousness question, would obviously include prior violent crime by the
defendant, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the defendant's re-
morse or lack thereof, and the defendant's reputation. An expert in psy-
chiatry or psychology is completely unnecessary for interpretation of such
factors.
As a result of these decisions, psychiatric evidence of future dangerous-
ness is now routinely introduced in capital murder trials. 64 "At least 121
Texas death row inmates were sentenced to death based on psychiatric
testimony. ' 65 Psychiatrists may even testify about future dangerousness
from evidence gleaned during competency and insanity evaluations 66 af-
ter obtaining a Sixth Amendment waiver from the defendant. Yet the
reliability of such predictions remains quite weak. 67
B. CIVIL COMMITMENT
The second major group of cases in which courts rely upon psychiatric
predictions of an individual's likelihood to become dangerous are civil
commitment hearings.68 A civil commitment hearing occurs when a re-
quest is made to a court to order an individual into psychiatric treatment
over the individual's objections or without the individual's consent.69
While laws vary from state to state on the specific criteria and proce-
dures, they all share some similarities.
First, all civil commitment schemes include a definition of mental ill-
63. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 938 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
64. "Courts uniformly assume that psychiatrists and psychologists are qualified to pre-
dict future dangerousness." FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 80.
65. A Danger to Society, supra note 9.
66. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989).
67. See discussion infra Part I1.B; see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 79 ("Most
courts either entirely ignore evidentiary standards for expert testimony concerning future
violence, or give it scant attention.").
68. The discussion of civil commitment in this article does not include Sexually Violent
Predator Acts. Such commitment schemes are separate from traditional ones, the individ-
uals are not always put in therapeutic settings, and the commitments can be for an indefi-
nite time period. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding that the
Kansas Act allowing a pedophile to be involuntarily committed beyond his prison sentence
is not a violation of the prisoner's due process rights, nor does it violate the Constitution's
prohibition against double jeopardy). Because these schemes differ in so many respects
from the civil commitment for mental illness, they are outside the scope of this article.
69. Catatonic individuals cannot express either objections or agreement:
Withdrawing, remaining quietly in one place for long periods, and immobility
are all common behaviors in this illness. The extreme versions of such be-
haviors are catatonia, where the person remains rigidly fixed in one position
for long periods of time, and mutism, where the person does not speak at all.
E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA 74 (4th ed. 2001).
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ness, but they range widely in what that definition encompasses. 70 Sec-
ond, a state typically defines who can request a petition. Such definitions
may include any witness to a mentally ill individual's erratic behavior, any
relative of the individual, police officers, mental health workers, and
prosecutors. Third, a psychologist or psychiatrist usually testifies at the
hearing. 71 Fourth, each statute provides continuing judicial review for ex-
tensions of time after the initial hospitalization. 72 Fifth, each state defines
what elements must be proven to result in a civil commitment, but every
state has a "dangerousness" element.73
The dangerousness element permits an individual to be civilly commit-
ted if, as a result of his mental illness, he is likely to become violent in the
near or reasonably predictable future. Civil commitment schemes typi-
cally require that the patient be likely to harm either himself or herself or
others,74 and some include damage to property as part of the considera-
tion.75 The standards for "likely to become" dangerous generally require
that the violence will occur almost immediately. 76
At civil commitment hearings, the dangerousness requirement mini-
mizes the importance of the psychiatric diagnosis and exaggerates the in-
quiry into the plausibility and rationality of the specific violent threat or
act. Bypassing the diagnosis itself, since mental illness alone is not
enough for involuntary psychiatric treatment,77 the hearing degenerates
70. See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo's Nest: Why do Courts Con-
tinue to Rely Upon Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1033 n.248(2002) (providing a survey of various terms used by state codes to define mental illness).
71. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 78.
72. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-420 (2002) ("Review of status of persons invol-
untarily committed for treatment."). Oklahoma, for example, requires a judicial review of
an involuntarily committed person's status every three months, and requires that the De-
partment of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services take action based upon the re-
view. Id.
73. Each state has a requirement relating to dangerousness or future violence. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-37(7) (2002) (respondent "poses a real and present threat of sub-
stantial harm to himself or to others"); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.700 (Michie 2001) (respon-
dent presents "a likelihood of serious harm to self or others"); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-540(2001) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a danger to himself or
others); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (Michie 2001) (respondent presents "a clear and
present danger to himself" or others); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 2001) (re-
quiring a finding of "present dangerousness").
74. See sources cited supra note 73 (reflecting the fact that each state requires a show-
ing that the respondent is likely to harm either self or others).
75. E.g. N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-27.1 (2002) (requiring a showing of "dangerous to
themselves, to others or to property"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02 (2002) (requiring a
showing of "serious risk of harm to that person, others or property").
76. E.g. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1 (2001) (requiring imminent danger); VA. CODE
ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Michie 2001) (requiring imminent danger); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2(2001) (considering if the respondent is "imminently dangerous"); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 51
1-119 (2001) (requiring dangerousness in the "near future"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 435.128(2001) (considering if there exists a "clear and present danger"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 5122.01 (Anderson 2002) (considering the "immediate risk"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-
12-234 (2000) (considering the "immediate danger").
77. As this author noted in an earlier article, the United States Supreme "Court's anal-
ysis of the liberty interest in the due process claim has practically resulted in a 'right to be
crazy.'" Davoli, supra note 70, at 1015-16.
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into an almost surreal analysis of the meaning of the specific behaviors
and comments of the patient.
Typical of this misplaced emphasis is the case of In re Retention of
Boggs.78 After a middle-class childhood, Joyce Brown graduated from
business school and worked ten years as a secretary. 79 She subsequently
developed schizophrenia and began calling herself Billie Boggs. 80 For
over a year she lived on the public sidewalk in New York City defecating
and urinating on herself and on the street; begging; tearing up paper
money; wearing filthy, torn clothing; and screaming insults at passers-
by.81 She was detained by city authorities, and a civil commitment hear-
ing was held to determine whether she should be involuntarily
hospitalized.82
At the hearing, the judge was presented with both defense and govern-
ment psychiatrists whose testimony conflicted.8 3 Instead of critically as-
sessing the credibility of the various experts' testimony,84 the lower court
decided to ignore all the expert evidence 85 and instead "place[d] great
weight on the demeanor, behavior and testimony of Joyce Brown [a.k.a.
Billie Boggs], herself."' 86 The court then analyzed each part of the evi-
dence in a vacuum, discounting completely the diagnosis of schizophre-
For the families of the mentally ill, the biggest shock of all is to discover that the law
supports the inalienable right of their family members to be crazy. If a son or daughter
becomes ill as a teenager, and is covered by a parent's insurance, in the initial phase of the
illness he or she will in all probability be treated. But as the illness recurs, families feel the
impact of the deranged legal system established by the mental health bar. They discover
that unless an individual is "dangerous," he cannot be treated against his will. The catch-22
is that the diseased organ is the brain, with the result that a very high proportion of the
mentally ill do not recognize there is anything wrong with them. Their delusions are con-
vincing and real to them, offering an explanation for their distorted perceptions of reality.
RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS 249 (1990).
78. 522 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
79. Margo Hornblower, Down and Out-But Determined; Does a Mentally Disturbed
Woman Have the Right to be Homeless?, TIME, Nov. 23, 1987, at 29.
80. Id.
81. 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 408-09.
84. In contrast, the appellate court analyzed both the evidence reviewed by the ex-
perts and the conclusions drawn from that evidence. "Moreover, Ms. Boggs pursued a
pattern of lying to both the respondents' psychiatrists as well as her own psychiatrists ....
In this connection, Ms. Boggs misled these psychiatrists." Boggs v. N.Y. City Health &
Hosp. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 365 (N.Y. 1987).
85. "In short, the psychiatric experts do not agree. In fact, the doctors are nearly
diametrically opposed in their assessment of Joyce Brown's mental condition and in their
predictions as to whether she is likely to cause herself or others harm. Thus, I derive little
psychiatric guidance from them ...." In re Retention of Boggs, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
86. Id. In fact, the appellate court found this to be erroneous:
We find that the Hearing Court erred in placing 'great weight on the de-
meanor, behavior and testimony' of Ms. Boggs, since the Hearing Court does
not claim that the demeanor and behavior of Ms. Boggs, when she appeared
before it, remotely resembled the demeanor and behavior she exhibited
when she lived on the streets, and was involuntarily committed to Bellevue.
Boggs, 132 A.D.2d at 364.
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nia, 87 paranoid type.88
As for the psychiatrists' opinion that Ms. Brown's habit of tearing up
cash resulted from delusions, the court disagreed. Instead, the court ac-
cepted her two explanations that, (1) "she perceives those who offer her
money as people trying to exercise control over her ... [and burning it]
was her way to dispel the control," 89 and (2) "she saw the offerers as
87. Schizophrenia is a serious mental illness:
Diagnostic criteria for Schizophrenia
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present




(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition
NOTE: Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or
hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the
person's behavior or thoughts, or two or more voices conversing with each
other.
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of time since
the onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning, such
as work, interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the level
achieved prior to the onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adoles-
cence, failure to achieve expected level or interpersonal, academic, or oc-
cupational achievement).
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6
months. This 6-month period must include at lest 1 month of symptoms
(or less if successfully treated) that meet Criterion A (i.e., active-phase
symptoms) and may include periods of prodromal or residual symptoms.
During these prodromal or residual periods, the signs of the disturbance
may be manifested by only negative symptoms or two or more symptoms
listed in Criterion A present in an attenuated form (e.g., odd beliefs, unu-
sual perceptual experiences).
D. Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder
and Mood Disorder With Psychotic Features have been ruled out because
either (1) no Major Depressive, Manic, or Mixed Episodes have occurred
concurrently with the active-phase symptoms; or (2) if mood episodes have
occurred during active-phase symptoms, their total duration has been brief
relative to the duration of the active and residual periods.
E. Substance /general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not
due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse,
a medication) or a general medical condition.
F. Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a his-
tory of Autistic Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder,
the additional diagnosis of Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delu-
sions or hallucinations are also present for a least a month 9or less if suc-
cessfully treated).
DSM-IV, supra note 16, at 285-86.
88. In re Retention of Boggs, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408. For the specific type of schizo-
phrenia:
Diagnostic criteria for 295.30 Paranoid Type. A type of Schizophrenia in
which the following criteria are met:
A. Preoccupation with one or more delusions or frequent auditory
hallucinations.
B. None of the following is prominent: disorganized speech, disorganized
or catatonic behavior, or flat or inappropriate affect.
DSM-IV, supra note 16, at 287.
89. 522 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
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Black males, whether they were or not, who wanted to buy sex. The de-
struction of the currency was her attempt to purge herself of the taint of
prostitution and elicit respect." 90 During her hearing, Ms. Brown testi-
fied that she "prefers to have no money on her person at night because
it's dangerous." 91 Although the court found nothing delusional about
perceiving non-black, non-male individuals to in fact be black men, it ad-
miringly noted that while her explanation for tearing up money "may not
satisfy a society increasingly oriented to profit making and bottom-line
pragmatism, .... it is consonant with safe conduct on the street and consis-
tent with the independence and pride she vehemently insists on assert-
ing."'92 The court concluded its analysis of Ms. Brown's destruction of
cash with the boasting flourish that "apparently, beggars can be
choosers." 93
In considering Ms. Brown's explanation for urinating and defecating on
the sidewalk, the court accepted her argument that the lack of public
bathrooms necessitated this behavior. "There being no public toilets ex-
cept at Grand Central and Pennsylvania Stations, both of which are too
distant from her post, she urinates and defecates on the street, though,
she insists, never on herself, while covering herself with a coat."' 94 Reli-
ance upon this explanation to discount the shocking, socially repugnant,
unhealthful, exhibitionist aspects of this behavior strikes the reader as
fanciful.
In reality, it was Ms. Brown's mental illness that reduced her inhibi-
tions95 and compelled her to live on the street in a Manhattan shopping
district without access to bathrooms that resulted in this behavoir. Yet,
the court accepted her testimony that bathrooms were unavailable with-
out inquiring into any efforts Ms. Brown made to locate a non-public
place for defecating and urinating. Instead of critically assessing Ms.
Brown's testimony, the courts mused that "to the passerby seeing her ly-
ing on the street or defecating publicly she may seem deranged .... But
how can anyone living in security and comfort even begin to imagine
what is required to survive on the street?" 96 The court thus accepted the
explanation that society's failure to provide public bathrooms wherever
Ms. Brown wandered, and not Ms. Brown's delusions, forced her to defe-
cate and urinate publicly.
Even though testimony was given describing an incident in which Ms.
Brown ran into traffic, the court accepted her decision as discounting any
possibility that she might harm herself. As the facts were in dispute, the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 410.
92. Id. at 411.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 410.
95. "A small number of patients are so ill that they continue inappropriate behaviors
(such as random urination, open masturbation, spitting on others) even in public." TOR-
REY, supra note 69, at 77.
96. In re Retention of Boggs, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
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court determined that Ms. Brown's behavior was provoked by city au-
thorities who attempted to render her assistance.
[The court noted that Ms. Brown] resented [the social workers']
presence, their help, their conversation, their offer of food and
clothes. Their persistent, often rejected assistance and their 'bad'
manner of treating her and speaking to her aroused her anger and
prompted her abusive, obscene language. One day she threw the
pants they gave her into the street. This is the occasion referred to
by the hospital psychiatrists when they allude to her running into
moving traffic. According to Ms. Brown, she stepped into the park-
ing lane, not the traffic lane. 97
The court found this explanation rational and compelling, and completely
discounted any possibility that Ms. Brown's behavior was either danger-
ous or resulted from her mental illness. 98 "As to the likelihood that she
would cause herself serious bodily harm, no proof has been offered to
substantiate the claim. The fear that she may provoke others to cause her
harm is without substantiation in her past history." 99
The court further assessed Ms. Brown's ability to meet her basic physi-
cal needs of food, clothing, and shelter. Her need for food was satisfied
by her begging for money and then buying one meal a day.100 While
admitting that Ms. Brown lived on the street "barefooted and dressed in
filthy, tattered, foul-smelling clothes," 10 1 this met the basic requirement
for clothes. "The legal question before me is whether Joyce Brown is
mentally capable of providing herself with clothes; the question is not
whether she is financially able to do so. '' 102 Yet the court failed to realize
that if Ms. Brown didn't tear up all paper money, she could probably
afford clean, non-tattered, fresh smelling clothes. 103 The court com-
pletely ignored the effect of her mental illness on her choice of attire.
For shelter, Ms. Brown had kept "warm by lying next to an air vent that
releases hot air 24 hours a day. The street is her bedroom, her toilet, her
living room."'01 4 Once again, the court blamed society for creating a need
for Ms. Brown to reject all other options and reside next to a heating
vent. 105 Without referring to any supporting testimony, the court deter-
97. Id. at 410.
98. "I accept Ms. Brown's version that she did not place herself in the line of moving
traffic." Id. at 411.
99. Id. at 412.
100. "With money she gets from panhandling, she buys one meal everyday at a neigh-
borhood store. This meal, the same daily, is comprised of a chicken cutlet, juice, milk and
ice cream." Id. at 408.
101. Id. at 412.
102. Id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
104. In re Retention of Boggs, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
105. In fact, the appellate court also noted the fallacy of this interpretation of Ms.
Brown's homelessness. "We reject, as against the weight of the evidence, the Hearing
court's conclusion that, in substance, Ms. Boggs' homelessness is not a result of serious
mental illness, but, rather, is the result of New York's lack of housing for the poor." Boggs
v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 365 (N.Y. 1987).
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mined that "[h]ousing in New York is an expensive commodity, so expen-
sive that in this rich city many no longer can afford it and are driven to
live on the street. '10 6 There was, however, no such evidence that poverty
produced Ms. Brown's homelessness.
Not only was society's callousness to blame for forcing Ms. Brown to
live on the streets, but the court further determined that there were no
reasonable alternatives. Ms. Brown "refuses to be housed in a shelter.
That may reveal more about conditions in shelters than about Joyce
Brown's mental state. It might, in fact, prove that she's quite sane. She
refuses confinement in Bellevue's psychiatric facilities, preferring free-
dom on the street with all its attendant risks. ' 107 Thus, Ms. Brown's un-
treated mental illness didn't reduce her to a filthy, begging, street person.
The court faulted society: "I am aware her mode of existence does not
conform to conventional standards, that it is an offense to aesthetic
senses. It is my hope that the plight she represents will also offend moral
conscience and rouse it to action."' 08
In addition, the court revealed its stereotypical bias that mental illness
strikes only the uneducated and depraved, 10 9 when it gushingly re-
marked, "throughout her testimony, Ms. Brown was rational, logical, co-
herent. Her use of English, both in syntax and vocabulary, is very good
and bespeaks an educated, intelligent person. She displayed a sense of
humor, pride, a fierce independence of spirit, quick mental reflexes." 110
The court did not explain, however, how qualities such as speaking
proper English or having a sense of humor, reveal any evidence of
whether a person is afflicted with a mental illness.
Another example of the reduced importance of a mental illness diagno-
sis and the exaggerated emphasis on predicting future violence occurs in
the Pennsylvania civil commitment scheme."' In Gibson v.
Digiacinto,1" 2 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and re-
manded the involuntary commitment of Russell Gibson. After reviewing
the evidence of dangerous behavior, the court determined that none of
Mr. Gibson's actions satisfied the commitment requirements, and re-
versed the lower court. 113
In its analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quickly brushed past
the testimony of a psychiatrist that Mr. Gibson is a "schizophrenic with
106. In re Retention of Boggs, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. "Other surveys have reported that many people continue to believe that schizo-
phrenia and other severe psychiatric disorders are caused by sin or weakness of character."
TORREY, supra note 69, at 387. See generally Oro F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC
IMAGES OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1995).
110. 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
111. See Steven B. Datlof, The Law of Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania: Towards a
Consistent Interpretation of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 38 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1999)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the Pennsylvania civil commitment laws).
112. Com. ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1981).
113. Id. at 107.
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paranoid delusions... [and] that appellant poses a clear and present dan-
ger to himself and others.""14 In fact, the supreme court seemed to ig-
nore major portions of the transcript cited by the lower court. "He
related that voodoo spirits were bothering him, people on the street were
putting voodoo on him, naked women were coming in and trying to rape
him .... He was very, very emotionally disturbed." 115 Separating the
actions of the appellant from his diagnosis, the supreme court suggested
explanations for the dangerous behavior that were wholly unsupported
by the evidence.
For example, the court dismissed as benign evidence that Mr. Gibson
had burned a newspaper in his cell. "There is no evidence of attempted
suicide or self-mutilation. The burning newspaper in appellant's cell can-
not be viewed as such an attempt. Appellant was permitted to smoke
.... "116 Yet, the guard's actual testimony, cited in the lower court opin-
ion but not mentioned by the higher court, was that "[a]s I opened the
cell, there was smoke ... Russell stamped out the fire. At that time, he
picked up a newspaper which was folded up and was approximately
burned one-quarter of the way ... there [were no other inmates] in Rus-
sell's cell at that time."' 17 While burning a newspaper in a jail cell may
not conclusively prove anything, the court's willingness to invent an ex-
planation is striking. The court doesn't refer to any testimony that the
newspaper was burning because Mr. Gibson was careless, or using it to
light cigarettes, or any other reason. The court appears to have seized
upon any reasonable explanation-even one not advanced during testi-
mony-as plausible enough to dismiss the obvious conclusion that burn-
ing a newspaper in a jail cell is potentially dangerous behavior.
The higher court dismissed evidence that Mr. Gibson possessed a
twisted piece of coat hanger discovered during a search. "Appellant's
possession of the piece of coat hanger allegedly fashioned into a weapon
was also not a proper basis for commitment. There was no testimony that
appellant used or threatened to use the hanger to injure himself or
others." 1 8 Yet, the lower court cited testimony that the coat hanger was
"bent out with the screw end out and the back part made so you could
grip it. It would be a very, very vicious weapon if you got it in the belly or
stomach."' 19
Additionally, the lower court cited several threats made by Mr. Gibson,
including the fact that his delusions contained persecution and retaliation
features. One psychiatrist testified that Mr. Gibson "believed that people
are against him and they want to kill him and he, in turn, had to kill
them.' 20 He elaborated that Mr. Gibson described "a kind of survival or
114. Id. at 106.
115. Corn. ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 395 A.2d 938, 940 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
116. Corn. ex rel. Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107.
117. Corn. ex rel. Gibson, 395 A.2d at 940.
118. Corn. ex rel. Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107.
119. Corn. ex rel. Gibson, 395 A.2d at 940.
120. Id. at 942.
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self-survival games. In other words, he thought that others were hurting
him, so to prevent it, he has to kill the person that survives." 12' Com-
bined with a specific threat to a guard, 122 testimony that Mr. Gibson was
"knocking furniture around,"'1 23 and possession of a weapon would seem
to satisfy the overt act requirement of the Pennsylvania code. However,
the higher court decided that none of the evidence "constituted the overt
act required" 124 for commitment.
Despite evidence that Mr. Gibson suffered from severe delusions, the
higher court also ignored his refusal to take his antipsychotic medications.
The lower court noted the psychiatrist's testimony that, "he was not com-
prehending realities ... he was hearing things from other sources ... he
believed that people are controlling his mind and then making him
sick."' 125 Yet, the appellate court emphasized that there "was no evidence
to show that his behavior changed as a result of missed doses" of medica-
tion. The court's analysis seems to purposely ignore the connection be-
tween refusal of medications and increase of psychotic symptoms such as
delusions.
The cases of Billie Boggs and Russell Gibson demonstrate that, instead
of recognizing a causal connection between the delusional individual's be-
havior and the diagnosis of mental illness, the courts tend to analyze the
two separately. This analysis ignores that the rationale for civil commit-
ment is to provide treatment for an afflicted individual, and appears to
reflect a suspicion of psychiatry. Both cases reveal that courts sometimes
invent reasonable explanations for odd behavior, even without support-
ing evidence. 126 Once a court seizes upon any plausible explanation, in-
stead of acknowledging that mentally ill individuals sometimes act
irrationally, the civil commitment is usually dismissed.
C. FLAWED PREMISES IN VIOLENCE PREDICTION
The courts' reliance upon psychiatric predictions of violence in capital
punishment and the reluctance to accept it in civil commitment hearings
are both based on different but equally flawed premises. In capital pun-
ishment, the flaw underlying the admissibility of such testimony is the
fiction that the capital murder defendant has somehow lost his ability to
exercise free will and make the choice of whether to re-offend. Because
the psychiatrist has no more insight into what future choices the defen-
121. Id. at 943.
122. Id. (Gibson said, "Well, somebody sent me to Fairview. You're going to pay.").
123. Id. at 941.
124. Com. ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. 1981).
125. Com. ex rel. Gibson, 395 A.2d at 942.
126. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (relating that the court surmised
that Joyce Brown's homelessness was probably caused by the high cost of housing in New
York City); supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (relating that the court found that




dant will make than the common man, such testimony lacks reliability
and relevancy.
Likewise, in civil commitment hearings, the flawed premise underlying
the marginalization of psychiatric testimony is the fiction that the individ-
ual will act rationally despite the fact that he is delusional. Thus, ignoring
the fact that a psychiatrist has testified that a patient is likely to become
violent as a result of his mental illness, these hearings tend to bog down on
the plausibility of the patient's plan for violence or on the inconsistencies
in his threats.1 27 Once the patient begins to act on his delusions and hal-
lucinations, discussions of rational behavior become irrelevant.
Traditional legal standards for mental illness envision a person suffer-
ing from a problem that robs him of free will. 128 This rationale underlies
both the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity 129 and the require-
ment that a defendant be competent to stand trial.' 30 The legal test for
competency may vary slightly among jurisdictions, but in essence, compe-
tency requires that the individual be aware of what is occurring at the
present time, understands the ramifications of his decisions, and can exer-
cise free will in making current decisions. Likewise, the theory inherent
127. See, e.g., TORREY, supra note 69, at 174-209.
Individual horror stories abound of clearly psychotic persons who could not
be involuntarily placed in treatment because of the stringent interpretation
given to 'dangerousness to self or others' by law enforcement and judicial
officials .... In Wisconsin, 'a man barricaded himself in his house and sat
with a rifle in his lap muttering Kill, kill, kill. A judge ruled that the man was
not demonstrably violent enough to qualify for involuntary commitment.'
At another commitment hearing in Wisconsin, a man with schizophrenia,
already mute and refusing to eat food or bathe, was observed to be eating
feces while being held in jail. He was released because such behavior did not
qualify as dangerous. The dialogue at the commitment hearing included the
following:
Public defender: Doctor, would the eating of fecal material on one occa-
sion by an individual pose a serious risk of harm to that person?
Doctor: It is certainly not edible material .... It contains elements that are
considered harmful or unnecessary.
Public defender: But, Doctor, you cannot state whether the consumption
of such material on one occasion would invariably harm a person?
Doctor: Certainly not on one occasion.
The public defender then moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that
the patient was in no imminent danger of physical injury or dying, and the
case was dismissed.
Id. at 189-90.
128. "[T]he underlying principle associated with insanity, lack of responsibility for 'in-
voluntary' actions is ancient. Excusing, and then treating, the insane for their antisocial
acts and violent propensities is, perhaps, the mark of a civilized society." FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 4.
129. "The criminal law assumes 'free will,' the capacity to make and act upon choices.
But the law is also willing to assume that mental disability reduces this capacity, thus mak-
ing the person less blameworthy and less able to obey the law's mandates." RALPH
REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL AsPEmIs 496 (2d ed. 1990).
130. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) ("[T]he test [for competency] must be
whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and ... a rational, as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him.").
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in every standard for the insanity defense131 is that the individual is una-
ble to exercise free will because of a mental illness. The theory of the
insanity defense is that, but for the mental illness, the crime would have
never been committed.
Psychiatry, however, does not limit itself to disorders that prevent the
exercise of free will. Psychiatry studies both brain and personality disor-
ders. 132 Because every single one of our actions and thoughts are con-
trolled by our brains, 133 there is psychiatric research on a wide variety of
issues. Yet many of these issues have no relevance in predicting violence,
or merely reflect common sense views on the topic. Substance and alco-
hol abuse are two examples.
While an addiction may be a relevant issue in mitigation, it is not a
defense to a crime. A criminal defendant cannot successfully assert co-
caine addiction as an insanity defense to a charge of cocaine posses-
sion. 134 However, psychiatric studies routinely include in their definition
of mental illness individuals who are substance abusers but suffer from no
other disorder.' 35 Such studies about the rate and frequency of mental
illness contribute to the mistaken idea that psychiatrists possess the ex-
131. "Jurisdictions have experimented with a wide assortment of insanity tests, ranging
from the M'Naghten right/wrong test to the Durham product rule; still other jurisdictions
have experimented by adding categories to the insanity defense, such as not guilty by rea-
son of insanity." LUBET, supra note 59, at 21.
132. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals & Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 605 (1978).
The first reason for limiting [psychiatric] experts to descriptions of behavior
is that their conclusions are based, in part, on mental health diagnostic cate-
gories that are generally overinclusive. These categories are much broader
than the crazy behaviors that seem to compel special legal treatment. The
various disorder categories delineated by both the present and proposed di-
agnostic manuals of the American Psychiatric Association may be ranged
along a quantitative and qualitative continuum of craziness. Some categories
seem to describe behavior that would be considered quite crazy, at least in its
extreme forms, by anyone. Others describe behavior that would not be con-
sidered crazy and, at worst, would be considered normally quirky.
Id. at 605.
133. BBC Online, BRAINSTORY, (Aug. 22, 2000) http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/
humanbody/articles/general/brainstory brainbasics.shtml.
On average the human brain weighs only 1.3Kg. Yet this mass of gray blanc-
mange is central to everything we do. It is the home of our thoughts, our
memories and our emotions. It controls the activities of our bodies and al-
lows us to experience the senses of touch, taste, sight, sound and smell. The
brain is made up of around 100,000,000,000 (100 billion) cells known as neu-
rons. Each neuron has up to 10,000 connections to other neurons within the
brain. These connections are known as synapses. Everything we do . . . is
controlled by our brain's circuitry.
Id.
134. A defendant also may not be found guilty for being a drug user or drug addict
without any other showing of criminal activity. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962) (overruling California law that a defendant may be found guilty for being a
drug addict without any proof that defendant used drugs within the state or participated in
any anti-social behavior). The Court held that the California statute "inflict[ed] a cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
135. See, e.g., Linda A. Teplin et al., The Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorder Among
Incarcerated Women, 53 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 505, 505 (1996) (Eighty per cent of
female pretrial detainees interviewed had symptoms of lifetime psychiatric disorders, and
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pert ability to predict violence in any case in which a defendant has a
disorder (including substance abuse and mental retardation) that is stud-
ied by psychiatry. 136
However, psychiatric research does intersect with legal theory in its
study of serious mental illnesses. These illnesses, including schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive disor-
der and panic disorder, 37 change the manner in which individuals behave
by interfering with free will. 138 The delusions and hallucinations suffered
by a schizophrenic, for example, alter that person's ability to distinguish
reality from the images resulting from his illness.139 While the individual
may remain competent on one level-knows what day it is, the name of
the current U.S. President, and can recite the roles of defense attorney,
prosecutor, and judge-he still remains unaware of the falsity of his delu-
sions,14° and thus is likely to act upon those delusions as if they were
reality. Such contradiction is demonstrated by the following conversation
between the mentally ill mathematician and Nobel laureate, John Nash,
and a long time friend, Harvard Professor George Mackey:
"How could you," began Mackey, "how could you, a mathematician,
a man devoted to reason and logical proof... how could you believe
that extraterrestrials are sending you messages? How could you be-
lieve that you are being recruited by aliens from outer space to save
the world? How could you ... ?
Nash looked up at last and fixed Mackey with an unblinking stare as
cool and dispassionate as that of any bird or snake. "Because," Nash
said slowly in his soft, reasonable southern drawl, as if talking to
himself, "the ideas I had about supernatural beings came to me the
same way that my mathematical ideas did. So I took them
seriously."141
70% were symptomatic within six months of the interview. The most common disorders
were drug or alcohol abuse or dependence and post-traumatic stress disorder.).
136. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the DSM-IV, which classifies all disorders studied
by psychiatry).
137. National Institute of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in
America, NIMH Publication No. 01-4584, www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfm (up-
dated Jan. 1, 2001).
138. "For many individuals with schizophrenia who are not on medication, logical
thinking is impossible." TORREY, supra note 69, at 311. For example, "Serious mental
illnesses (SMI) interfere with employment. An estimated 57 percent of adults with SMI
were not employed in 1990 compared to 29 percent of the general population." National
Alliance for the Mentally I11, http://www.nami.org/helpline/factsandfigures.html (Jan.
2001).
139. See TORREY, supra note 69, at 30-87.
140. "Despite cognitive deficits that affect complex information processing, many indi-
viduals with schizophrenia may appear superficially oriented and attentive, readily able to
recognize familiar objects and persons, and able to communicate without obvious confu-
sion-all aspects of mental capacity." Davoli, supra note 70, at 1043 n.288 (quoting June
R. Husted, Insight in Severe Mental Illness: Implications for Treatment Decisions, 27(1) J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 33, 34 (1999)).
141. SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND 11 (1998).
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Thus, the psychotic delusions do not entirely replace reality. Instead,
they complicate reality until the afflicted individual cannot differentiate
reality from delusions.
Serious mental illnesses interfere with an individual's exercise of free
will in a manner quite different from substance abuse or other, non-psy-
chosis-inducing disorders. 142 While addiction itself may strongly influ-
ence the decisions one makes, the addict is still making conscious choices
and is aware of his actions, particularly when sober. The drug addict may
feel compelled to steal in order to support his habit, but he is not com-
pelled by his delusions. Rather, he is controlled by his desire for the sub-
stance. While he may lack the self-control to fight off his addiction, he
does not suffer from delusions, such as his need to use narcotics or alco-
hol to save the world from aliens, 143 to keep cannibals from taking over
the government, 144 or because the President needed him to prevent world
hunger.145 Yet those are exactly the type of beliefs held by seriously
mentally ill individuals who become violent.
Applying psychiatric predictions of violence to capital murder cases is
flawed because the analysis fails to acknowledge the fact that the capital
murder defendant has not lost his free will. Individuals who have been
convicted of capital murder have either been found both sane and compe-
tent, or have waived both the insanity and incompetence defenses prior
to trial. Therefore, if they suffer from a serious mental illness, either it
did not result in an acquittal or was not asserted by the defense.
A criminal defendant who is not suffering from delusions is exercising
his free will-he determined to commit certain acts and intended the con-
sequences of his acts. Expert testimony is not needed to explain to the
jury that an individual has free will and may decide to kill again. Psychi-
atric testimony is not needed to explain to the jury that murderers are
more likely to kill again than non-murderers. An expert in statistics can
explain that to the jury. 146 Yet that is the substance of the psychiatrist's
prediction of future dangerousness in cases where the defendant does not
suffer from a serious mental illness.
In essence, the jury is given the impression that the psychiatrist has
somehow looked inside the defendant's brain and found that future vio-
lence is ready to burst out at the first opportunity. In fact, the psychiatrist
142. Widiger & Troll, supra note 19, at 203-26.
143. NASAR, supra note 141, at 11; see also id. at 253-61.
144. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
145. Mr. Head "came to believe that he would be 'the one' that would bring salvation
or special benefit to the world, and 'find a way of helping everyone else in the world."'
Psychological Report, supra note 1, at 37.
146. Barefoot v. Estelle 363 U.S. 921-22 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The APA also concludes ... as do researchers that have studied the issue that
psychiatrists simply have no expertise in predicting long-term future danger-
ousness. A layman with access to relevant statistics can do at least as well
and possible better; psychiatric training is not relevant to the factors that
validly can be employed to make such predictions, and psychiatrists consist-
ently err on the side of overpredicting violence.
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is either applying statistical evidence or guessing. 147 Speculation is not
admissible in court, and 148 when a speculating witness has first paraded
his credentials before the court and is qualified as an expert in an area
that appears to include mind-reading, 149 his testimony is not only damag-
ing but also diminishes the integrity of the criminal justice system. Since
the defendant is not delusional as a result of mental illness, he can choose
to kill again. The defendant is not a robot, but has the ability to exercise
free will. No expert should be permitted to testify otherwise.
A psychiatrist's prediction of violence in the case of an individual not
suffering from a serious mental illness has no greater weight or validity
than a layperson's opinion. Simply because psychiatrists have an opinion
on the defendant's future behavior should not automatically result in the
admissibility of that opinion. As discussed below, the testimony should
be related to the expert's area of expertise and be based in sound scien-
tific evidence. 150
In contrast, only individuals suffering from a mental illness are subject
to civil commitment.' 5' A competent attorney representing the respon-
dent in a civil commitment hearing would certainly question the accuracy
of the diagnosis of mental illness. Relevant areas of inquiry into the qual-
ity of the examination would include: (1) whether the medical history was
reviewed; 152 (2) whether a physical examination was performed; 53 (3)
whether a social history was gathered; 54 and (4) whether the patient ac-
tually exhibits enough of the symptoms of the alleged illness to justify the
diagnosis 155
Once the petitioner has met his burden of proof156 regarding the accu-
racy of the diagnosis, the court should consider its consideration on the
147. See id. at 920-22.
148. "Witnesses may not be asked to speculate or guess." LUBET, supra note 59, at 306.
149. Dr. Grigson had "testified against 124 murderers, and impressionable juries have
sentenced 115 of them to death. After years of examining killers, Dr. Death believes that
most are not mentally disordered at all, but instead match the diagnosis: 'mean son of a
bitch.' His specialty is predicting which of them is likely to kill again .... Ann Jones, In
the Darkest Corners, WASH. POST BOOK REV., Jan. 27, 1991, at X7 (reviewing RON ROSEN-
BAUM, TRAVELS WITH DR. DEATH AND OTHER UNUSUAL INVESTIGATIONS (1991)).
150. See infra Part III.
151. Civil commitment is primarily a state level function, and the states have various
definitions for what constitutes mental illness. See Davoli, supra note 70, at 1033 n.248
(providing a survey of various terms used by state codes to define mental illness).
152. See infra Part II.A.1.
153. See infra Part II.A.1.
154. See infra Part II.A.1.
155. See infra Part II.A.2.
156. The burden of proof is "clear and convincing." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979). In Addington, the United States Supreme Court decided upon the clear and con-
vincing standard because of its mistrust of psychiatric diagnosis:
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which
might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disor-
der, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally accept-
able. Obviously, such behavior is no basis for compelled treatment and
surely none for confinement. However, there is the possible risk that a
factfinder might decide to commit an individual based solely on a few iso-
lated instances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls for a showing that
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likelihood of future violence as a result of the individual's mental illness,
not as a result of reasonableness or feasibility of his threats or behavior.
The flawed premise underlying the marginalization of psychiatric evi-
dence in civil commitment cases is that the mentally ill individual's free
will is not affected by psychosis, and that the patient will not act in accor-
dance with his delusions.
II. SCIENTIFIC STUDIES OF PSYCHIATRY AND
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
Scientific research has examined whether diagnoses of mental illness
are reliable and whether or not psychiatrists are able to accurately predict
who will become violent in the future. Research into the validity and
reliability of psychiatric diagnosis reveals that certain diseases are more
easily and uniformly diagnosed than others. 157 Research also reveals
when and under what circumstances a psychiatrist can make reasonably
reliable predictions about a patient's future.1 58
A. RELIABILITY OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS
Great faith is placed in medical diagnoses on a daily basis. Individuals
receive treatment for high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, and
influenza without much skepticism. If there is concern about the accu-
racy of a diagnosis or the advisability of a prescribed treatment, a "second
opinion" might be sought from another doctor with expertise in the field.
The resulting second opinion typically results in identical diagnoses with
very similar treatment plans. 159
Both popular media and court opinions, however, consistently reflect a
belief that psychiatry is an inexact pseudo-science. 160 Contrary to such
depictions, there is great integrity in the diagnosis of mental illness. The
validity of the diagnosis that an individual is suffering from a major
mental illness such as schizophrenia depends upon the thoroughness of
the examination, similar to the validity of any other diagnosis. Certainly,
it is possible to misdiagnose a mental illness because of poor medical
the individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by
idiosyncratic behavior.
Id. at 426-27. This quote reflects the same type of concern reflected in other civil commit-
ment hearings described in this article. See supra Part I.B.
157. HAROLD L. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY: BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENCES/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1 (1998) ("Clinical experience has shown that, on
the basis of such assessment, it is possible, with respect to certain diagnostic entities, to
predict patients' responses to therapy with a fair degree of accuracy. For example, the
acute symptoms of many patients with schizophrenia improve with appropriate anti-
psychotic medication .... ").
158. See infra Part II.B.
159. See, e.g., University of Minnesota Cancer Center Getting a Second Opinion, http://
www.cancer.umn.edu/page/patients/opinion.html (Dec. 19, 2002) ("In most cases, second
opinions support the recommendation of the first physician."); Yale Medical Group, http://
info.med.yale.edu/yfp/sec-opin.html (Apr. 11, 2001) ("Getting a second opinion most often
results in the second physician affirming what the first physician initially recommended.").
160. Davoli, supra note 70.
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practice, but it is just as easy to misdiagnose a physical ailment such as
diabetes. Both types of examinations must follow accepted medical prac-
tice to ensure their validity.
While many scholars have lamented that psychiatry is too inexact a sci-
ence to satisfy admissibility requirements,161 the majority of their data
dates from some time ago. 162 Dated material fails to take into account
the dramatic advances made in the study of mental illness and often re-
flects obsolete or incorrect theories about psychiatry. 163 Psychiatry has
refined its diagnosis and treatment methods over the past fifty years, 164
however, with significant advances and discoveries made in the last ten
years. Thus, the present day reliability of psychiatric diagnosis is much
greater than it has been in the past.
1. Complete Psychiatric Examination
An accurate psychiatric diagnosis requires a complete examination,
also referred to as a diagnostic workup. The workup must include a his-
tory and mental status examination, whereby the doctor inquires about
visual hallucinations, headaches, recent head injuries, and the use of
street drugs and medications. 65 A review of the patient's prior medical
history is important. A physical examination is also necessary to elimi-
nate the possibility that a physical ailment, such as viral encephalitis, 66 is
causing the symptoms of mental illness. A neurological examination
161. Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case
Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 921 (2000) ("Unfortunately, the validity of psychiatric
opinion is hard to gauge. A diagnosis is merely a hypothetical construct; it lacks clear
objective referents."); Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After
Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 875 (1994) ("Are psychiatrists' assess-
ments of the mental capacity of a defendant at the time of the crime 'testable' or 'falsifi-
able' or 'refutable'? Plainly not. Can we determine the 'error rate' or psychiatric opinion,
or utilize standards to control the technique's operation? Again, plainly not.").
162. For example, Professor Slobogin relied on a source that was twenty-two years old.
Slobogin, supra note 161, at 921 ("Unlike much physical disorder that often can be verified
by various tests that measure pathology (whether or not cause of symptom, syndrome, or
condition is known), there is no objective, empirical referent of mental disorder other than
crazy behavior itself." (citing Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An
Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 607 (1978))).
163. Professor Slobogin also relies on Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693,
721 (1974), which states that "each school of psychiatry has a different view of what mental
illness is, how it is caused, and how it should be treated," and Paul Lazare, Hidden Concep-
tual Models in Clinical Psychiatry, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 345 (1973), which identifies four
models of behavioral science: medical-in which mental state is caused by biological condi-
tions; psychologic-which interprets personality as the result of patterns established in
youth; behavioral-which sees behavior and accompanying thoughts as the result of spe-
cific aversive or reinforcing events; and social-which focuses on relationships with family,
peers and institutions as major influences on mental condition. Slobogin, supra note 161, at
919.
164. Davoli, supra note 70.
165. TORREY, supra note 69, at 180.
166. "There are several diseases of the body that can produce symptoms similar to
schizophrenia .... It has been known for many years that viral encephalitis can produce
schizophrenia-like symptoms." Id. at 110. "Although psychiatrists do not perform routine
physical examinations on their patients, they should be able to distinguish physical diseases
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should "help identify patients with other brain diseases, such as brain tu-
mors or Huntington's disease, who may initially present with schizophre-
nia-like symptoms. ' 167 Basic laboratory work should include a complete
blood count, blood chemical screen, and urinalysis. 168 Psychological tests
will also assist the doctor in reaching an accurate diagnosis. 169 Other di-
agnostic tests performed may include magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scans, computerized tomography (CT) scans, and lumbar punctures. 170
The thoroughness of the workup produces a diagnosis with a high level of
accuracy.
The reliability of a diagnosis of mental illness is supported by scientific
research. Studies have been performed that prove both the existence of
mental illness and the ability of psychiatrists to consistently diagnosis the
same symptoms and reach identical results. "It no longer seems neces-
sary to apologize for poor diagnostic reliability in psychiatry. Carefully
constructed interview schedules and lists of diagnostic criteria, together
with rigorous training of raters, have caused a quantum jump in the mag-
nitude of psychiatric reliability.' 71 Psychiatric diagnoses currently have
similar levels of reliability to other medical fields such as radiologists'
interpretations of mammograms, and the assessment of spasticity in pa-
tients with spinal cord injury.' 72
Psychiatric examinations also recognize that some patients may be mo-
tivated to fake an illness or trick the evaluator. Such behavior is called
malingering:
Malingerers have an obvious, recognizable environmental goal in
producing signs and symptoms. They may seek hospitalization to se-
cure financial compensation, evade the police, avoid work, or merely
obtain free bed and board for the night, but they always have some
apparent end for their behavior. Moreover, these patients can usu-
ally stop producing their signs and symptoms when they are no
longer considered profitable or when the risk becomes too great.173
that mimic psychiatric disorders and vice versa." KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 157, at
268.
167. Id. at 180.
168. Id.
169. DAVID L. WODRICH & SALLY A. KUSH, CHILDREN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING: A
GUIDE FOR NONPSYCHOLOGISTS 15 (1990).
[Psychological t]ests focus on observable, objective, quantifiable behavior.
They strive to produce results that can be subjected to scrutiny by peers.
Research on psychological testing is reported in highly technical journals in a
format conducive to criticism, investigation, and replication. The principals
and procedures associated with testing are embedded in a carefully thought-
out system called psychometric theory .... Research often combines obser-
vation, logic, and powerful statistical methods, the signs of a mature science.
Id.
170. TORREY, supra note 69, at 181.
171. William M. Grove et al., Reliability Studies of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 38 ARCHIVES
OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 408 (1981).
172. Roberta F. White et al., Interrater Reliability of Neuropychological Diagnoses: A
Department of Veterans Affairs Cooperative Study, 8 J. OF THE INT'L NEUROPSYCHOLOGI-
CAL Soc'Y. 555-65 (2002).
173. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 157, at 658.
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The DSM-IV recognizes malingering and lists specific concerns that
strongly indicate a patient might be faking his condition. 174 Psychological
tests specifically control to eliminate the ability of the patient to feign
symptoms of mental illness.
Additionally, while experts may routinely answer hypothetical ques-
tions in their testimony, such evidence should not be admissible unless
the expert's profession has adopted that method. Similar to every area of
medicine, psychiatrists do not typically diagnose without first examining
the patient and reviewing all the relevant medical records. While there
may be some limited exceptions to this rule, 175 answering hypothetical
questions is not the accepted manner for psychiatrists to diagnosis
patients.
2. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth
Edition
The American Psychiatric Association publishes the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.176 This exhaustive manual catego-
rizes types of psychiatric illness and lists the diagnostic criteria for classi-
fying a patient's illness. The specific diagnostic "criteria include a list of
features that must be present for the diagnosis to be made. Such criteria
increase the reliability of clinicians' process of diagnosis."'1 77 The DSM-
IV provides clarity and consistent standards for the diagnosis of mental
illness.
With the DSM-IV as the foundation, a variety of different studies have
been performed to assess and improve the accuracy of psychiatric diagno-
sis. "To improve diagnostic accuracy, several structured clinical inter-
174. DSM-IV, supra note 16, at 683.
The essential feature of Malingering is the intentional production of false or
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by exter-
nal incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining finan-
cial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs. Under
some circumstances, Malingering may represent adaptive behavior-for ex-
ample, feigning illness while a captive of the enemy during wartime.
Malingering should be strongly suspected if any combination of the follow-
ing is noted:
1. Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the person is referred by an
attorney to the clinician for examination)
2. Marked discrepancy between the person's claimed stress or disability
and the objective findings
3. Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying
with the prescribed treatment regimen
4. The presence of Antisocial Personality Disorder.
Id.
175. "Diagnosis without Examination: Is it ethical to offer a diagnosis based only upon
review of records to determine, for insurance purposes, if suicide was the result of illness?
Yes. Is it ethical for a supervising psychiatrist to sign a diagnosis on an insurance form for
services provided by a supervisee when the psychiatrist has not examined the patient? Yes,
if the psychiatrist ensures that proper care is given and the insurance form clearly indicates
the role of supervisor and supervisee." KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 157, at 1324.
176. DSM-IV, supra note 16.
177. KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 157, at 287.
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views, such as the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R178 (SCID)
and the National Institute of Mental Health Diagnostic Interview Sched-
ule (DIS), have been created and tested.' 79 Reviews of these methods
reveal that structured interviews result in more accurate diagnoses "be-
cause they facilitate symptom reporting while systematically probing
symptoms and behaviors that clinicians may overlook, hence reducing
variability.' '180
Yet, an individual does not suffer from a mental illness merely because
he meets the criteria for a diagnosis in the DSM-IV. The DSM-IV lists all
diagnosable conditions, some that are completely irrelevant to legal is-
sues. In fact, the DSM-IV warns that "in most situations, the clinical di-
agnosis of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to establish the
existence for legal purposes"'181 of the various conditions defined in law.
Thus, courts need to critically assess the relevance of an individual's diag-
nosis when determining whether to admit psychiatric testimony.
B. RELIABILITY OF PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
Legal scholars are beginning to recognize that psychiatric evidence can
be of some value in predicting violence, but only in those cases where the
patient suffers from a serious mental illness and meets other criteria.
There are two types of predictions. One is based solely on the clinical
assessment of the patient. The other involves applying statistics to the
relevant factors. "In the past several years, the field of 'violence risk as-
sessment' has seen a dramatic shift away from studies attempting to vali-
date the accuracy of clinical predictions, and toward studies attempting to
isolate specific risk factors that are actuarially (meaning statistically) as-
sociated with violence."'1 82
Recent studies have "demonstrated that clinicians may be fairly accu-
rate in predicting dangerousness ... when their prediction concerns an
inpatient psychiatric population over a relatively short period of time ....
178. DSM-III-R is the precursor to the DSM-IV:
DSM-II-R, published in 1987, is a third generation revision of the original
DSM, that was developed in 1952 by the American Psychiatric Association.
DSM-II was published in 1968, followed by DSM-III in 1980. The manual is
the primary classification system for psychiatric disturbances occurring in
children and adults .... It is widely used by everyone connected with psychi-
atry, from trainers and prospective clinicians to insurance companies to hos-
pital staff workers.
WODRICH & KUSH, supra note 169, at 161.
179. Monica Ramirez Basco et al., Methods to Improve Diagnostic Accuracy in a Com-
munity Mental Health Setting, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1599-605 (2000).
180. Id. at 1599.
181. Id.
182. John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment. Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Ad-
missibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905-06 (2000) (referring to Helena Chmura Krae-
mer et al., Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 337
(1997)). "To say that a variable is a 'risk factor' for violence means only two things: (1) the
variables correlates with the outcome (in this case, violence), and (2) the variable precedes
the outcome. To call a variable a 'risk factor' does not imply that its relationship to the
outcome is in any sense 'casual."' Id. at 905 n.27.
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This research does not, however, support the idea that clinicians are accu-
rate in predicting the long-term dangerousness of a criminal defen-
dant. ' 183 Psychiatric evidence is most relevant and reliable when the
individual is seriously mentally ill with an affliction that results in
delusions.184
The factors consistent with the profile of someone with mental illness
who is imminently dangerous include the following: (1) suffers from a
serious mental illness, (2) non-compliance with treatment and medica-
tion, (3) use of narcotics or alcohol, (4) previous violence, (5) currently
psychotic, and (6) suffers from hallucinations and delusions. Predictions
tend to be more reliable when they concern the immediate future. 185 In
addition, the state of psychosis is not constant. Rather, it waxes and
wanes with the illness. When symptoms are in a state of flux, predictions
are more accurate when made at the time of the psychosis concerning the
behavior likely to occur during that time period.
1. Serious Mental Illness
Predictions of future violence are more accurate when they concern an
individual who suffers from a major mental illness. "[S]erious mental dis-
order by itself is quite significantly associated with violence."' 86 Typi-
cally, such illnesses include delusions or hallucinations. "Hallucinations
occur in a heterogeneous group of psychiatric disorders, particularly
schizophrenia, major mood disorders (e.g., bipolar disorder and major de-
pression), personality disorders, and dissociative disorders."'1 87
Research has shown that "(1) the prevalence of violence is over five
times higher among people who meet criteria for a DSM-III Axis I diag-
nosis... than among people who are not diagnosable... ; (2) the preva-
lence of violence among persons who meet criteria for a diagnosis of
schizophrenia, major depression, or mania/bi-polar disorder is remarka-
bly similar. 1 88 Evidence that serious mental illness correlates with vio-
183. Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert
Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
267, 310 n.2 (2001) (referring to Dale E. McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Confi-
dence and Accuracy in Clinical Assessment of Psychiatric Patients' Potential for Violence, 22
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 655-71 (1998)).
184. See generally Pamela J. Taylor et al., Delusions and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND
MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT (John Monahan & Henry J.
Steadman eds., 1994).
185. "Patients were at highest risk for involvement in violence in the first 20 weeks after
hospital discharge." JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MAC-
ARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 34 (2001).
186. Jeffrey W. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence:
An Epidemiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN
RISK ASSESSMENT 119 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994).
187. McNiel, supra note 52, at 184.
188. John Monahan, Scientific Status, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 94. In the
DSM-IV, Axis I Clinical Disorders are the following: Delirium, Dementia, and Amnesic
and Other Cognitive Disorders; Mental Disorders Due to a General Medical Condition
Substance-Related Disorders Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders; Mood Disor-
ders; Anxiety Disorders; Somatoform Disorders; Factitious Disorders; Dissociative Disor-
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lence supports the argument that psychosis interferes with an afflicted
individuals' ability to exercise free will.
2. Non-Compliance with Treatment and Medication
The second risk factor for violence is that the afflicted individual does
not routinely take prescription medications or attend psychiatric treat-
ment sessions. "The common denominators of [individuals with schizo-
phrenia] who are assaultive and violent are abuse of alcohol or drugs and/
or non-compliance with antipyschotic medication."' 89 Medication non-
compliance is a significant risk factor for violence primarily because with-
out the antipsychotic medication, the individual becomes delusional.
Several studies have confirmed that non-compliance with medication is
a major risk factor for violence. For example, one study in Virginia
demonstrated that patients who refused their medication "were more
likely to be assaultive, were more likely to require seclusion and restraint,
and had longer hospitalizations."' 90  Another study found that
"[s]eventy-one percent of the violent patients.., had problems with med-
ication compliance, compared with only 17 percent of those without hos-
tile behaviors." 191 Failure to comply with anti-psychotic medication may
stem from several causes, including lack of insight' 92 and dislike of side-
effects,193 but that failure greatly increases the risk that the mentally ill
individual will become violent. 194
3. Narcotics and Alcohol
The third risk factor occurs when an individual has a dual diagnosis,
which means being diagnosed as both mentally ill and a substance abuser.
"Dually diagnosed patients demonstrate increased rates of hospitaliza-
tion, utilization of acute care services, housing instability and homeless-
ness, violent and criminal behavior, and suicidal behavior. 1 95 Although
substance abuse alone increases an individual's risk of becoming violent,
"respondents with dual diagnoses had a much greater risk of violence
ders; Sexual and Gender Identify Disorders; Eating Disorders; Sleep Disorders; Impulse-
Control Disorders; Not Elsewhere Classified; Adjustment Disorders; and Other Condi-
tions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention. DSM-IV, supra note 16, at 26.
189. TORREY, supra note 69, at 307.
190. John A. Kasper et al., Prospective Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotic Medi-
cation Under a Physician Discretion Review Procedure, 154 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 483-89
(1997).
191. Stephen J. Bartels et al., Characteristic Hostility in Schizophrenic Outpatients, 17
SCHIZOPHRENIA 163-66 (1991).
192. "Decreased awareness of illness is officially referred to in neurological terms as
anosognosia .... The lack of awareness of illness is the largest single cause of the need for
involuntary hospitalization and medication." TORREY, supra note 69, at 79-80.
193. "A third major reason for medication noncompliance among individuals with
schizophrenia is the side effect of the medication." Id. at 296.
194. Fred Osher & Lial Kofoed, Treatment of Patients with Psychiatric and Psychoactive




than those with mental disorder alone."' 96
Research has demonstrated that "[m]entally disordered individuals
with substance abuse comorbidity are significantly more likely to be vio-
lent than those with mental disorder alone." 197 One study concluded that
"[s]ubstance abuse was diagnosed as co-occurring with mental disorders
in 40-50% of cases in the patient group," and that "[t]he presence of sub-
stance abuse increased the frequency of both serious violence and other
aggressive acts."'1 98
4. Prior Violence
Individuals with a prior history of violence are more likely to become
violent in the future.199 "Violent behavior results from a complex inter-
action among a variety of social, clinical, personality, and environmental
factors whose relative importance varies across situations and time. °200
Yet no matter what the cause, previous violence is a clear risk factor for
future violence.
5. Hallucinations and Delusions
"Research ... has identified a positive relationship between hallucina-
tions and violent behavior." °20' The type of hallucinations suffered by the
individual-particularly command hallucinations-and occurrence during
the acute period of the illness contributes to the likelihood of violent be-
havior. "Command hallucinations are auditory hallucinations that in-
struct the patient to act in a certain manner. The actions that command
hallucinations order the patient to perform range from the insignificant,
such as making facial grimaces, to those as serious as suicidal or homici-
dal acts."1202 The timing of the hallucination is likewise important, since
"[m]ost studies documenting associations between hallucinations and vio-
lence have evaluated patients during acute episodes of illness, such as the
period just before or after hospital admission. °20 3
Other variables also affect the likelihood of whether or not the halluci-
nating individual will become violent. When an individual suffers from
an untreated mental illness, and has been responding to hallucinations,
there is a high likelihood that he will continue to behave in the same
manner. In fact, "if a patient has a history of behaving violently in re-
sponse to hallucinations, the risk of assault is obviously higher than would
196. Swanson, supra note 186, at 113.
197. Id. at 119.
198. Kirk Heilbrun & Gretchen Witte, The MacArthur Risk Assessment Study: Implica-
tions for Practice, Research, and Policy, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 733, 747-48 (1999).
199. "Clearly, prior violence and criminality are strongly associated with the
postdicharge violent behavior of psychiatric patients." MONAHAN ET AL., supra note 185,
46-47.
200. Widiger & Troll, supra note 19, at 216.
201. McNiel, supra note 52, at 194.
202. Keith Hersh & Randy Borum, Command Hallucinations, Compliance, and Risk
Assessment, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 353 (1998).
203. McNiel, supra note 52, at 195.
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be the case with only the knowledge that the patient is hallucinating. '2 0 4
Additionally, "[e]ven among people who had never been formally treated
for mental disorder, actively experiencing psychotic symptoms was associ-
ated with the commission of violent acts. ' 20 5 Thus, the significance of a
prior violent history increases when the individual's previous violence has
occurred simultaneously with his suffering from hallucinations.
In addition, the location of the individual at the time of his hallucina-
tions may affect whether he will become violent. Several studies have
concluded that "patients with paranoid schizophrenia are more likely to
be violent outside the hospital setting, but are not especially violent in
hospital settings following an initial period of stabilization. 2 0 6 Since
even individuals who were not previously hospitalized become violent
when psychotic,207 involuntary hospitalization may not only offer safe ha-
ven to the afflicted, but may also have an immediate, positive affect on
the individual's behavior.
Delusions may affect the likelihood that an individual will act violently
while hallucinating. "Delusions ... are erroneous beliefs that usually in-
volve a misinterpretation of perceptions or experiences. Their content
may include a variety of themes (e.g., persecutory, referential, somatic,
religious, or grandiose). 2 0 8 An example of an individual suffering from
delusions who then acts violently because of a hallucination would be if
Mr. Patient has the delusion that he is all-powerful and must kill anyone
who defies him, and then has a hallucination that the President is defying
him. Mr. Patient would then feel obligated to kill the President. "[I]t
appears that the presence of a delusional belief consistent with the con-
tent of the hallucination increases the likelihood of compliance ....
[P]rior research has shown the presence of delusions related to perceived
threat or an overriding of one's internal controls is associated with in-
creased risk for violent behavior. °20 9
Research clearly demonstrates that active hallucination increases the
risk that a mentally ill individual will become violent. "The currently
mentally disordered-those actively experiencing serious psychotic symp-
toms-are involved in violent behavior at rates several times those of
nondisordered members of the general population. ' 210 Such evidence
demonstrates the importance of a clinical assessment in violence
prediction.
204. Id.
205. John Monahan, Scientific Status, in FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 95.
206. McNiel, supra note 52, at 195.
207. John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence,
47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 517 (April 1992).
208. DSM-IV, supra note 16, at 275.
209. Hersh & Borom, supra note 202, at 357.
210. Monahan, supra note 207, at 517.
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III. SOLUTION: REPLACE SOOTHSAYING WITH
SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
In addressing the admissibility of psychiatric evidence, courts should
acknowledge that the consequences faced by the individual subject to the
death penalty are much more serious than those faced by the individual
subject to civil commitment. 211 While an inaccurate diagnosis or
prediction of violence in civil commitment might result in depriva-
tion of the individual's liberty, it is for a fixed period of time,212 in a
therapeutic-not penal-setting,213 with the additional oversight of psy-
211. While civil commitment may negatively affect an individual's quality of life in such
ways as stigmatizing that individual, see, e.g., OTro F. WAHL, MEDIA MADNESS: PUBLIC
IMAGES OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1995), an unfair death sentence is still immeasurably more
serious than an unfair civil commitment.
212. REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 129, at 740.
Although at one time commitment in many states was truly indeterminate,
most states now require . . . that a review hearing be held after a certain
period of involuntary treatment. Typically, a hearing similar in kind to the
initial adjudicatory hearing must be held within six months of the previous
commitment; other fairly common review periods are three months and a
year.
Id.
213. The number of severely mentally ill individuals imprisoned now greatly exceeds
the number in psychiatric hospitals. Yet, the penal setting is much more brutal for a men-
tally individual:
For most individuals with schizophrenia, the experience of being jailed varies
from "unpleasant" to "a living hell." Being ridiculed by guards or other pris-
oners is the least problem; in some jails "mental cases" wear uniforms of a
different color and so are readily identifiable .... Jails require prisoners to
follow rules, but following rules assumes that your brain is thinking logically.
For many individuals with schizophrenia who are not on medication, logical
thinking is impossible. Such individuals commit bizarre acts that cause
problems for everyone. In California, a newspaper reported that mentally ill
inmates in one jail "try to escape by smearing themselves with their own
feces and flushing themselves down the toilet."
TORREY, supra note 69, at 311.
One day last month Jesus Portelles, stripped naked and convinced that de-
mons had entered his body, used the broken edge of a plastic spoon to carve
open his stomach. By the time the guards could unlock his cell door and grab
him, his guts were spilling out. But the demons stayed.
That same day Luis Nunez was freed from four-point restraints-which
bound him by the wrists and ankles, spread-eagled on a bare metal slab-
after a change in medication helped him to stop smashing his head against
the wall until he bled. And he was better for a while. When I was there, he
was on his feet and yelling "Where are my shoes?!" But last week he was
back in full restraints.
As sick as they are, Portelles and Nunez are not in a psychiatric facility where
they should be.
Instead, they are prisoners in the Miami-Dade County Jail, two of more than
325 men charged with felonies and even misdemeanors who are being heav-
ily medicated and warehoused in small, cold, overcrowded and filthy cells in
what has become the largest psychiatric facility in the state of Florida ....
[They are held in] the maximum security section of the psych ward, where up
to 40 inmates identified as acutely ill and extremely violent are held in 24-
hour lockdown .... They are permitted no books, no pencil, not a stitch of
clothing, nothing that could be fashioned into a weapon or a noose. Visitors
are not allowed. The inmates are not taken out for exercise. They have no
access to a telephone ....
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chiatrists,214 and typically with additional court hearings required for in-
The single bunk has no mattress or sheets. Food comes in Styrofoam boxes
shoved through a slot in the steel door. Offered a shower three times a
week, prisoners often refuse it. When the stench grows unbearable, guards
pull uncooperative inmates out of their cells and slosh them down with a
green garden hose.
It wasn't supposed to be this way. But with state hospitals closing, and few
community-based heath services available for mentally ill criminals consid-
ered a danger to themselves and others, three floors of the fifty-year-old jail
at 1321 NW 13th St. now serve as the asylum of the new millennium. Thanks
to psychotropic drugs that can sedate even the most disturbed prisoner, the
jail isn't exactly bedlam. Outbursts of screaming and wailing, bouts of self-
mutilation, and psychotic breakdowns where prisoners eat or throw their
own feces are frequent but not constant. But even on the best of days, the
jail's psych ward is a gloomy, forbidding madhouse ....
"It's hell, it truly is," says forensic psychologist Merry Haber. "Medieval. If
you saw this in any other country you'd call it a human rights abuse."
Even the jail's staff admits that conditions are horrible, especially for the
one-fourth of the jail's 1750 inmates suffering from mental illness. "It's a
shocking environment: old barbaric, archaic," sighs Joseph Poitier, the jail's
chief psychiatrist for the past eight years. "Primarily we practice triage, and
then it's management by medication. The jail environment is not conducive
to traditional treatment. We do the best we can."
Arrested in December, Nunez several weeks ago was judged competent and
allowed to plead guilty to misdemeanor assault, and sentenced to 364 days in
county jail. So he's doing his time-in four point restraints.
Mike Clary, The Snake Pit, MIAMI NEw TiMES, July 11, 2002.
214. The United States Supreme Court endorsed this "gatekeeper" function of psychia-
trists in juvenile cases:
As with most medical procedures, Georgia's are not totally free from risk of
error in the sense that they give total or absolute assurance that every child
admitted to a hospital has a mental illness optimally suitable for institutional-
ized treatment. But it bears repeating that "procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."
Georgia's procedures are not "arbitrary" in the sense that a single physician
or other professional has the "unbridled discretion" the District Court saw to
commit a child to a regional hospital. To so find on this record would require
us to assume that the physicians, psychologists, and mental health profession-
als who participate in the admission decision and who review each other's
conclusions as to the continuing validity of the initial decision are either ob-
livious or indifferent to the child's welfare-or that they are incompetent. We
note, however, the District Court found to the contrary; it was "impressed by
the conscientious, dedicated state employed psychiatrists who, with the help
of equally conscientious, dedicated state employed psychologists and social
workers, faithfully care for the plaintiff children ......
This finding of the District Court also effectively rebuts the suggestion made
in some of the briefs amici that hospital administrators may not actually be
"neutral and detached" because of institutional pressure to admit a child who
has no need for hospital care. That such a practice may take place in some
institutions in some places affords no basis for a finding as to Georgia's pro-
gram; the evidence in the record provides no support whatever for that
charge against the staffs at any of the State's eight regional hospitals. Such
cases, if they are found, can be dealt with individually; they do not lend
themselves to class-action remedies.
We are satisfied that the voluminous record as a whole supports the conclu-
sion that the admissions staffs of the hospitals have acted in a neutral and
detached fashion in making medical judgments in the best interests of the
children. The State, through its mental health programs, provides the author-
ity for trained professionals to assist parents in examining, diagnosing, and
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voluntary administration of medications 215 or other treatments. 216
In contrast, an inaccurate diagnosis or prediction of violence in a capi-
tal murder case results in the defendant being executed. With a death
sentence, there is no fixed period of time after which the accuracy of the
mental illness diagnosis or violence prediction will be reviewed. 217 While
awaiting execution, the defendant remains in prison. If medical person-
nel ever treat the defendant again, they make no inquiry into the validity
of the initial diagnosis to re-assess whether the defendant needs to be
executed. 218 Appellate review concerns trial errors made by the judge. 219
An inquiry into the accuracy of the psychiatrist's diagnosis or prediction
of violence never occurs once the defendant is sentenced to death.220
treating emotionally disturbed children. Through its hiring practices, it pro-
vides well-staffed and well-equipped hospitals and-as the District Court
found-conscientious public employees to implement the State's beneficent
purposes.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 615-16 (1979) (citations omitted).
215. "[S]everal courts have now recognized a 'right to refuse' psychotropic medication
for institutionalized populations, in the process constitutionalizing a version of the in-
formed consent doctrine in that context. The precise scope of this right is still being
fleshed out .... " REISNER & SLOBOGIN, supra note 129, at 848.
216. Two feared psychiatric treatments are eclectrocardio (ECT) and psychosurgery,
commonly referred to as lobotomy. State legislatures tightly restrict the availability of
these procedures, which vary from complete prohibition to requiring court orders. See
Davoli, supra note 70, at 1040 n.282 (listing the availability of ECT and psychosurgery in
various states).
217. "[M]ost of the errors caught in time are corrected not thanks to the system but in
spite of the system-that is, in spite of the obstacles to re-investigating and reopening a
case, to persuading a higher court to reconsider, and to securing executive intervention to
halt the march to the execution chamber." RADELET ET AL., supra note 8, at 280.
In addition, although the Supreme Court bars the execution of a mentally incompetent
defendant, see infra note 220, the burden of proof is generally on the defendant to raise the
issue post-sentencing. For example, in Texas, a defendant must file a motion to the trial
court, which retains jurisdiction over the issue of post-sentencing competency:
If a defendant is determined to have previously filed a motion under this
article, and has previously been determined to be competent to be executed,
the previous adjudication creates a presumption of competency and the de-
fendant is not entitled to a hearing on the subsequent motion filed under this
article, unless the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a substantial
change in circumstances sufficient to raise a significant question as to the
defendant's competency to be executed at the time of filing the subsequent
motion under this article.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.04 (Vernon 2002).
218. Of course, a competent psychiatrist may diagnose the convicted murderer with a
different illness than was identified in trial testimony. But there is no subsequent review to
determine the accuracy of the trial diagnosis, and nothing is done if subsequent examina-
tions reveal that the defendant was not mentally ill.
219. NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY 561 (2001).
The scope and rules for direct review are determined by each jurisdiction,
but such review generally is limited to issues arising from the record of the
trial proceedings. Absent specific provisions permitting appellate courts to
take evidence, issues on direct review cannot be based on factual information
that is not included as evidence in the official transcripts of the trial.
Id.
220. The only reconsideration of the defendant's psychiatric illness occurs if he asserts
that he is too insane to be executed. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
(reversing denial of habeas corpus relief where Eighth Amendment prohibited execution
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Thus, the risks of an inaccurate diagnosis and prediction of violence in
capital murder cases are immense since an execution is irreversible, while
the risks associated with an inaccurate diagnosis and prediction of vio-
lence in civil commitment cases are minimal. Commitment is not a per-
manent condition, and requires on-going judicial approval for extending
hospitalization or outpatient treatment. Yet the courts tend to rely on
psychiatric predictions most when the risks of misdiagnoses are greatest.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned and protected the testimony of the
psychiatrist in capital murder cases221 where the risk of error is high and
the results are irreversible. However, the Supreme Court is silent, and
lower court rulings reflect a suspicion of psychiatry in civil commitment
cases where the risk of error is much lower and the result is extremely
limited.222 Courts could do a better job of assessing the admissibility of
predictions of future dangerousness if they incorporate the analysis inher-
ent in the Federal Rule of Evidence for admission of expert testimony.223
A. DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
A federal evidentiary test for admissibility of evidence does exist. In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,224 the United States Su-
preme Court reviewed the admissibility of scientific evidence in a federal
trial. The Daubert plaintiffs sued Merrell Dow claiming that the an-
tinausea drug it produced caused them serious birth defects. The district
court granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment by ruling
that the plaintiff's experts' testimony was inadmissible. Pursuant to the
standard expressed in Frye v. United States,225 the district court reasoned
that scientific evidence is admissible "only if the principle upon which it is
based is 'sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to
which it belongs."' 226 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.227
of the insane and where petitioner had been denied factfinding procedure adequate to
afford full and fair hearing on issue of competence to be executed). There is never a recon-
sideration of whether or not he is likely to be dangerous in the future.
221. See infra Part IIA-B.
222. See discussion supra Part I.B.
223. LUBET, supra note 59, at 216.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that expert opinions are
admissible where the expert's "scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue." Thus, there are two threshold questions: (1) Does the
witness possess sufficient scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge?, and (2) Will that knowledge be helpful to the trier of fact?
Id.
224. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
225. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the trial court did not err when it refused
to allow expert testimony as to the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test taken
by appellant because the test had not yet received the required standing and scientific
recognition from psychological and physiological authorities).
226. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583 (quoting United States v. Klingus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
227. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
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The Supreme Court first determined that the controlling law in this
area is no longer the traditional test expressed in Frye.228 The Court ar-
ticulated that the Federal Rules of Evidence have displaced the Frye test,
and have thus removed the requirement that the "thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. '229 The Court fur-
ther stated that the federal rules do not incorporate the "general accept-
ance" standard of Frye.230
Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a spe-
cific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general accept-
ance," the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is
unconvincing. Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for
admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent
from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should
not be applied in federal trials.23'
The Court then held that "under the [Federal] Rules, the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant, but reliable. '232 The relevance standard reflects the
traditional rule that only testimony and other evidence relevant to the
issues in a case are admissible. 233
The second prong of Daubert's admissibility test requires that scientific
evidence must be reliable to be admissible. In order for expert testimony
"to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference of assertion must be
derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported
by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known.
In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific
knowledge' established a standard of evidentiary reliability. '234
The Court elaborated on its decision by making additional comments
to guide the lower courts. First, the lower courts should determine
whether the scientific theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested.
'Scientific Methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is
what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry." 235 Sec-
ond, the lower court should inquire into "whether the theory or tech-
nique has been subjected to peer review and publication. '236 While a
228. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
229. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 101-14).
230. Id. at 588-89.
231. Id. at 589.
232. Id.
233. "Relevance defines the relationship between the proffered evidence and some fact
... at issue in the case. Evidence will not be admitted simply because it is interesting or
imaginative. Rather, it must be shown to be probative ... that it makes some disputed fact
either more or less likely." LUBET, supra note 59, at 312.
234. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
235. Id. at 593 (quoting CHARLES R. GREEN & ERIC D. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES,
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).
236. Id.
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lack of peer review is not an absolute bar to admissibility of evidence,
submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of
'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive
flaws in methodology will be detected. '237
The Court further suggested that "in the case of a particular scientific
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential
rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards control-
ling the technique's operation. '238 The Court also left room in these con-
siderations for the concept of "general acceptance" being considered in
the admissibility standard, just not controlling of it. "Widespread accept-
ance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible,
and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal sup-
port within the community' may properly be viewed with skepticism. '239
Thus, these guidelines address threshold issues that courts should review
prior to ruling on the admissibility of the expert testimony.
B. THE APPLICATION OF DAUBERT TO PSYCHIATRY
Applying the Daubert admissibility test to psychiatric evidence reveals
that such testimony is relevant and reliable in some contexts, but not in
others. Although this seems contradictory, every science has limitations
and thus can provide reliable and relevant guidance in some areas, but
not others. For example, a toxicology test can tell within a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty whether a "fatal amount" of a drug was ad-
ministered, but it usually cannot answer the specific question of exactly
how many pills or doses of that drug an individual consumed.240 Another
example is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence. While some types of
DNA testing can positively match genetic material with a particular sus-
pect,24 1 other DNA tests do not have that ability.242 Thus, the reliability
237. Id.
238. Id. at 594.
239. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1985)).
240. For example, a fatal dose depends on the drug metabolism that varies from indi-
viduals and is influenced by age, weight, health and other variables.
241. Nuclear or STR DNA fingerprints can identify any individual (or identical twin)
on the planet, assuming you have a database that includes the individual's nuclear STR
DNA fingerprint (or you have a suspect to test that has the identical nuclear STR DNA
fingerprint). Most scientists accept a "13 locus STR profile" as identity. Phone Interview
with Dr. Keith McKenney, Associate Professor, George Mason University (May 1, 2003).
Y chromosome STR DNA fingerprints are used when nuclear STR DNA fingerprints are
mixed, as with a rape victim with multiple suspects, or the donor is not available, but living
direct paternal descendents are known. Like mito typing, Y STRs are shared by all pater-
nal relatives and so the statistical arguments on frequency of Y STR types is required to
assist in evaluating a DNA "match." Fortunately, like mito typing, Y STRs are used much
less frequently that nuclear (multi-locus) STR typing. Id.
242. Mitochondrial DNA is used when the nuclear STR DNA fingerprint fails and the
case is important (mitochondrial DNA costs 10-20X more). Mito DNA is good for exclu-
sions, but an inclusion is not identity. Mito DNA fingerprints are maternally transmitted,
and all maternal relatives have the same mito type. The commonality of the type depends
on the frequency found in a database and brings in statistical arguments. Fortunately, mito
type is much less than 1% of DNA cases. Id.
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and relevancy of toxicology or DNA testing will vary depending upon the
particular facts of a case. The same is true for psychiatry.
Thus, when presented with psychiatric evidence, the trial court must
determine not only whether psychiatry in general is reliable and relevant,
but also whether psychiatry is reliable and relevant regarding the specific
issue it is addressing in the case. Such a focus would require that, in addi-
tion to expert testimony on the diagnosis and evaluation of the defen-
dant, the psychiatrist would also explain the significance and relevance of
the following: psychological tests performed and the error rate of such
tests; what controls exist to prevent against "cheating" or exaggeration of
symptoms by the patient; the current state of scientific research into the
diagnosis; and the reliability of the diagnosis and violence prediction. Be-
cause the expert is already subject to an inquiry (voir dire) of his qualifi-
cations, this inquiry into the reliability of the science itself can occur
either simultaneously or by other experts prior to the admission of the
expert conclusions.
In capital murder cases, the Supreme Court seems to have "assumed
that experts are better than lay jurors at predicting violence. If they are
not, then this testimony has no probative value and should be excluded
on that basis alone. '243 Since the majority of capital murder defendants
do not suffer from a serious mental illness, they do not fit the profile of
an individual about whom psychiatry can accurately predict future behav-
ior. Additionally, since long-term predictions of violence are unreliable
such testimony should be inadmissible.
In civil commitment cases, the question of future dangerousness is a
fairly narrow one. The court wants to know whether the respondent is
going to become violent in the very near future as a result of the respon-
dent's current symptoms of psychosis or other exacerbation of the re-
spondent's mental illness. The court is not deciding whether all
individuals with that specific mental illness are violent, or whether the
respondent will ever become violent at any point in the future. Rather,
the court is focusing on one individual's behavior in the immediate
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
In capital murder cases, scientific evidence should be allowed in court
only if it passes scientific standards of reliability. Likewise, in civil com-
mitment cases, the proponent of any psychiatric evidence should be re-
quired to introduce evidence of reliability linked to the actual diagnosis
of the patient. The standard of admissibility should be the same in both
cases but the result will likely be that psychiatric evidence is much more
curtailed in capital murder cases, but will carry more weight in civil com-
mitment hearings.
243. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 84.
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A reconsideration of the two cases described at the beginning of this
article demonstrates the wisdom of reversing the current trend. In the
case of Mr. Head, the young man who killed his mother while psychotic,
the medical profession could have acted quickly to detain him once he
began acting delusional. The detainment would have confined him dur-
ing the most acute time period of his illness and possibly prevented him
from killing his mother.
Once detained, the court would review not only Mr. Head's current
mental state, but also the following significant factors: (1) his documented
history of serious mental illness,244 (2) his marijuana use,245 (3) his non-
compliance with medications, 246 (4) his recent, extremely violent suicide
attempt,247 and (5) his documented hallucinations that included homici-
dal and suicidal thoughts.248 Such evidence greatly enhances the reliabil-
ity of the psychiatrist's prediction, and the testimony of the psychiatrist as
an expert is necessary to explain the diagnosis and treatment of schizo-
phrenia. All combined, such factors demonstrate that he presented the
clinical picture of an imminently violent schizophrenic, and the court
would have civilly committed him for involuntary psychiatric treatment.
His mother's desperate pleas would not have been ignored and left to
foreshadow her fate. Mr. Head should not have had to kill someone to
get help. 24 9
In the capital murder trial of the wrongly convicted Mr. Adams, how-
ever, the psychiatrists' testimony would be inadmissible for a variety of
reasons. First, psychiatry does not condone diagnosing a patient without
first examining him or thoroughly reviewing the relevant medical records.
244. "Before his mother's death, Head had been treated and hospitalized repeatedly at
various mental health centers around Fairfax. That included a five-week stay at Inova
Fairfax in May and June 1998 after slashing his own throat through to the trachea and
leaping out a second-floor window of his house." Tom Jackman, Reston Family Sues in
Insanity Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2000, at C1.
245. "[I]t is my opinion to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that the follow-
ing diagnoses apply in Mr. Head's case: Axis I: Schizoaffective Disorder, Mixed Type Can-
nabis Abuse, in remission in a controlled environment." Psychological Report, supra note
1, at 44.
246. Id. at 5-17.
247. "Less than two months earlier, he'd been in the same unit after slashing his throat
to the windpipe and leaping headfirst off a balcony." Jackman, supra note 4, at B2.
248. "Head told a social worker that night: 'I could lose control at any time. I could
end it right here.' His medical chart included the notation, 'Homicidal and agitated (to-
wards parents)." Id.
249. Tom Jackman, Reston Man Committed in Slaying of Mother; Mental Disorders
Cited by Experts, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1999, at B3.
A Reston man who beat his mother to death with a baseball bat last year-
later telling doctors a chess piece had ordered him to kill her-was formally
committed to a mental hospital yesterday. Alfred L. Head, 22, will be reeval-
uated regularly by a Fairfax County judge to determine whether he is fit to
return to society .... His attorney, Joanmarie I. Davoli, said the case 'under-
scores the flaw' in civil commitment laws because she said, Head's mother
had tried to obtain help for her son but couldn't until he demonstrated that




It is not a sound psychiatric practice to diagnose by answering hypotheti-
cal questions. Second, psychiatric evidence should not be admissible un-
less it is supported by credible evidence that there is scientific reliability
in predictions of dangerousness. Third, the testimony of a psychiatrist is
completely irrelevant unless the defendant actually suffers from a mental
illness that produces delusions or hallucinations and thus interferes with
his free will. Since none of these conditions were satisfied at the time of
Mr. Adams' trial, the psychiatric testimony would have been inadmissible
and the jury would have had to rely upon common sense to determine
whether Mr. Adams should receive the death penalty.
Absent Dr. Grigson's testimony, the remaining evidence of prior crimi-
nality against Mr. Adams would have been "a drunk-driving conviction
and a minor A.W.O.L. violation, the sole blemish on his record during
three years of service as an army paratrooper. '250 Without the testimony
of the prosecution's psychiatrist, the jury would not have heard any pre-
diction that Mr. Adams would continue killing if not executed. Perhaps
the jury's decision would have been the same, but as Justice Blackmun
stated in his dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle:
[It is unacceptable that] psychiatric testimony about a defendant's
future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testi-
mony is wrong two times out of three .... One may accept this in a
routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at
stake-no matter how heinous his offense-a requirement of greater
reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of
a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the
inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates
with death itself.251
250. RADELET ET AL., supra note 8, at 62.
251. 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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